University of Denver

Digital Commons @ DU
Sturm College of Law: Faculty Scholarship

University of Denver Sturm College of Law

2006

The United States as a Democratic Ideal? International Lessons in
Referendum Democracy
K.K. DuVivier
University of Denver, kkduvivier@law.du.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/law_facpub
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, International Law Commons, and the Law and Politics
Commons

Recommended Citation
K.K. DuVivier, The United States as a Democratic Ideal? International Lessons in Referendum Democracy,
79 Temple L. Rev. 821 (Fall 2006).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at Digital
Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Sturm College of Law: Faculty Scholarship by an authorized
administrator of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,digcommons@du.edu.

The United States as a Democratic Ideal? International Lessons in Referendum
Democracy
Publication Statement
Copyright is held by the author. User is responsible for all copyright compliance.

This article is available at Digital Commons @ DU: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/law_facpub/318

THE UNITED STATES AS A DEMOCRATIC IDEAL?
INTERNATIONAL LESSONS IN REFERENDUM
DEMOCRACY
K.K. DuVivier*
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.
II.

III.

IV .

V.

VI.

INTROD UCTION ..............................................................................................
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES .........................................................
A. Initial Restraints on Direct Democracy...............................................
B. Citizen Participationat the National Level through the Petition
Clause.....................................................................................................
C. Direct Democracy at the State Level ...................................................
D. Citizen Participationat the State Level through Referendums ..........
DIRECT DEMOCRACY WORLDWIDE ...........................................................
A . H istory ...................................................................................................
B. Increased Use of Referendums.............................................................
TYPES OF REFERENDUMS .............................................................................
A. Origin of Referendums: Government or Citizen Sponsored.............
B. Effect of Referendums: Binding v. Advisory ......................................
REFERENDUMS AND THE EU CONSTITUTION ............................................
A. Short History of the EU and the ProposedEU Constitution............
B. E U G overnance.....................................................................................
1. The European Parliam ent ...............................................................
2. The Council of M inisters .................................................................
3. The European Com m ission .............................................................
C. D irect D em ocracy in the E U ................................................................
1. Direct Democracy in the Ratification Process ..............................
2. Direct Democracy through the European Citizens' Initiative .....
REFERENDUMS IN THE UNITED STATES .....................................................
A. ConstitutionalProhibitionsAgainst Binding Referendums ..............
B. Advisory Referendums Under the Petition Clause.............................
C. An Advisory Referendum Process as an Agenda-Setting Tool .........

822

824
824
827
830
833
834
835
840
841
842
845

849
849
852
853
853
854
855
858
861

864
865
868
871

* Associate Professor, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. I am deeply grateful to the

following colleagues and friends for their support and valuable input on this piece: J. Robert Brown,
Penelope Bryan, David 0. DuVivier, Richard K. Neumann Jr., John H. Reese, Louis J. Sirico Jr., and
Don C. Smith. I also would like to thank Diane Burkhardt, Nate Kunz, Brea Burgie, David
Wunderlich, and David W. McDaniel for their research assistance. Finally, I appreciate the
administrative support provided by Leah Kilpatric, Janae Kirby, Kristin Schneider, and Laura Wyant.

TEMPLE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

1. Revising Congressional Rules .........................................................
2. A R eferendum Statute .....................................................................

872
875

If we are asking the rest of the world to adopt our idea of freedom,
it does seem to me that there may be some mutuality there, that
other nations and other peoples can define and interpret freedom
in a way that's at least instructive to us.... Liberty isn't for export
only.'

-Associate Justice Anthony Kennedy
Supreme Court of the United States
I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States at one time represented the most radical of
governments-the only fully functioning democracy in the Western world.
Leaders were chosen by the people themselves, not by the military or through
heredity. The transition of power took place peacefully, without coups or riots or
military intervention. 2 Despite some undemocratic aspects, the government in
3
the United States became a model for other countries.
Over time, however, democracy has become far less unique. Most industrial
countries have adopted a democratic model, and every continent contains
countries with this form of government. 4 As the number of democracies has
grown, the "undemocratic" nature of the United States system has become
increasingly apparent. The Founding Fathers, leery of rebellions caused by too
many liberties, eschewed direct democracy in favor of a system of limited
representative democracy. The people had a vote in choosing their
representatives in the House, but state legislators, not the people, designated
5
those who went to the Senate or participated in the Electoral College.
Furthermore, it was the Electoral College, not the people, who elected the
6
President.
1. Jeffrey Toobin, Swing Shift: How Anthony Kennedy's Passionfor Foreign Law Could Change
the Supreme Court, NEW YORKER, Sept. 12, 2005, at 42, 50 (quoting Anthony Kennedy, Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States).
2. See, e.g., JOHN FERLING, ADAMS VS. JEFFERSON: THE TUMULTUOUS ELECION OF 1800, at

207-09 (2004) (describing transition from Federalist controlled U.S. government to one dominated by
Jefferson's Republican Party).
3. See infra notes 5-6, 20-28 and accompanying text for a discussion of departures from direct
democracy in the republican form of government established in the United States.
4. STEVE MUHLBERGER,

The View

of Tatu Vanhanen, in CHRONOLOGY

OF MODERN

DEMOCRACY (2003), http://www.nipissingu.ca/department/history/muhlberger/histdem/vanhanen.htm
(citing TATU VANHANEN, THE EMERGENCE OF DEMOCRACY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF 119
STATES, 1850-1979 app. at 137-159 (1984)) (summarizing and adapting statistics showing democracy in
some form on every permanently populated continent).
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, § 1; U.S. CONST. art. II, §
1, cl. 2. See infra note 25 and accompanying text for additional discussion of the election of U.S.
Senators by state legislatures.
6. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
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The United States gradually removed many of the most undemocratic
elements from its system of government. The Seventeenth Amendment
authorized the people to elect Senators. 7 While the Electoral College remained
in place, the law in all fifty states gradually permitted the people, rather than
legislatures, to select the electors, effectively providing for direct election of the
8
President.
For all of the reform, however, the United States government continues to
lack a key component of democracy-a direct role for the people to participate
in the legislative process. The United States remains one of the few significant
democracies in the world that has never held a referendum 9 or "mass electorate
vote[] on some public issue." 10 Only two other major democracies have failed to
11
employ such a process.
The analysis in this Article involves five segments. First, a trace of the
evolution of the United States government highlights the restraints the Founding

7. Id. amend. XVII.
8. See id. art. II, § 1, cl.
2. ("Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof
may direct, a Number of Electors...."); U.S. Nat'l Archives & Records Admin., Who Selects the
Electors?, http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/electoral-college/selects.html
(last visited Jan. 3,
2006) (explaining that general election votes for United States President are actually votes for partydesignated electors, although electors' names may not appear on ballot).
9. "We speak of referendums, not referenda, on the advice of the editors of the Oxford English
Dictionary: 'Referendum is logically preferable as a plural form meaning ballots on one issue (as a
Latin gerund referendum has no plural). The Latin plural gerundive referenda, meaning "things to be
referred" necessarily connotes a plurality of issues."' David Butler & Austin Ranney, Practice, in
REFERENDUMS AROUND THE WORLD: GROWING USE OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY 1, 1 n.1 (David
Butler & Austin Ranney eds., 1994) [hereinafter REFERENDUMS AROUND THE WORLD]. Despite

debate, other authors have followed Butler and Ranney's lead, using "referendums" instead of
"referenda" as the plural. See, e.g., Michael Gallagher & Pier Vincenzo Uleri, Preface, in THE
REFERENDUM EXPERIENCE IN EUROPE, at i, viii (Michael Gallagher & Pier Vincenzo Uleri eds.,

1996) (considering respective arguments for "referendums" and "referenda" and ultimately settling on
former).
10. Butler & Ranney, supra note 9, at 1. Even though the word "referendum" derives from the
word "refer" and has been used only for measures that a political entity refers to the people, recent
commentators have embraced the term to mean any "mass electorate vote[] on some public issue." Id.
Although the word "plebiscite" seems to more accurately describe any vote of the people, the word
has taken on a negative connotation because plebiscites in Germany and other parts of the world were
used as ad hoc votes to reinforce the actions of dictators. Id. at 1 & n.1. For example, in March of 1936,
Hitler's Reichstag was approved by 98.1%

of Germans. MAIJA SETALA,

REFERENDUMS AND

DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT: NORMATIVE THEORY AND THE ANALYSIS OF INSTITUTIONS 1-2 (1999).

11. Note that the number has decreased in recent years and probably will continue to decrease.
Laurence Morel, The Rise of Government-Initiated Referendums in Consolidated Democracies, in
REFERENDUM DEMOCRACY: CITIZENS, ELITES AND DELIBERATIONS IN REFERENDUM CAMPAIGNS

47, 50 tbl.2.1 (Mendelsohn & Parkin eds., 2001) [hereinafter REFERENDUM DEMOCRACY]. Morel
notes that the following "have not had any referendums since democracy": India, Israel, Japan, the
Netherlands, and the United States. Id. at 50. Since the time of Morel's statement in 2001, however,
the Netherlands held a nationwide referendum on the European Union Constitution. Todd Richissin,
Netherlands Votes Against EU Charter-DecisionFollows Rejection by France Days Earlier, BALT.
SUN, June 2, 2005, at 1A. Also, Israeli officials have committed to holding a national referendum on
any peace agreement with the Syrians. Elizabeth Garrett, Issues in Implementing Referendums in
Israel: A ComparativeStudy in Direct Democracy, 2 CMI. J. INT'L L. 159, 159 (2001).
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Fathers placed on direct democracy. 12 Second, an analysis of referendums in
other democracies illustrates how they developed and situations in which they
are most often employed. 13 Third, a review of the general types of referendums
shows the most significant distinctions in how they originate and their effect."4
Fourth, an examination of the efforts to create a European Union ("EU") wide
process for referendums shows that, despite some weaknesses, these efforts may
be promising. 15 Finally, this Article will examine issues and impediments
concerning the implementation of referendums at the federal level in the United
States, concluding that the United States should implement a system of
nonbinding referendums that will provide for national votes on matters of
16
widespread importance.
II.
A.

DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES

InitialRestraints on Direct Democracy

We sometimes forget the truly revolutionary nature of the United States
Constitution implemented in 1789. At the time, no other country of any
significant size provided for an elected head of state. A king or emperor sat on
the throne of Great Britain, France, and Russia. The French Revolution, begun
the same year, temporarily overthrew the hereditary ruler. Yet instead of
replacing it with democracy, the French government reverted to another form of
autocratic leadership.
In contrast, the Founding Fathers of the United States diverged from
contemporary European models and focused on the power of the people. As
Thomas Jefferson wrote in the Declaration of Independence, governments gain
their legitimacy by "deriving their just powers from the consent of the
governed. 17 The Founders struggled, however, over the exact form of

12. See infra Part II.A for a discussion of the initial restraints the Founding Fathers placed on
democracy.
13. See infra Part III for a discussion of the use of referendums worldwide.
14. See infra Part IV for an overview of the types of referendums and their effects.
15. See infra Part V.A & V.C for an examination of the efforts to create an EU process for direct
democracy.
16. See infra Part VI for an argument that the United States should institute a system of
nonbinding referendums for voting on issues of national significance.
17. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). Jefferson embraced Locke's

views and advocated that Locke be one of three mandated readings for all students. See Dennis
Polhill, Democracy's Journey, in THE BATTLE OVER CITIZEN LAWMAKING: A COLLECTION OF

5, 8-9 (M. Dane Waters ed., 2001) (providing overview of direct democracy in the United
States). The government that eventually evolved was based on democratic principles from Locke. See
generally JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (Alexander Campbell
Fraser ed., Dover Publications 1959) (1690) (espousing basic principles of government with consent of
ESSAYS

those governed); JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT (J.W. Gough ed.,

A.R. Mowbray & Co. 1947) (1690) (discussing formation of civil and political societies that safeguard
citizens' natural rights). See also CHARLES-LOUIS DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE
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government that would allow the people enough, but not too much,
participation. As one scholar has noted, "Government by the people represents
the maximum, as government for the people represents the minimum of the
democratic process.' 18 Driven by fear and practical considerations, the
Constitution at inception reflected some "distrust of popular decision making."' 9
The Framers considered but rejected the model of direct democracy used in
Ancient Greece. As Madison noted in FederalistNo. 10, a "pure democracy" or
"a society consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer
the government in person" was defective because it offered no cure for "the
mischiefs of faction." 20 The result, concluded Madison, was chaos: "[S]uch
democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever
been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and
have in general been as short in their lives, as they have been violent in their
'21
deaths."
Such concerns prompted the Founders to implement a limited form of
republican government. 22 The people directly elected only members of the
House of Representatives. 23 Members of the Electoral College, selected by the
state legislators rather than the people, chose the President. 24 Similarly, these

SPIRIT OF LAWS 4-6 (Mortimer J. Adler ed., Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. 1971) (1748) (asserting that
system of balanced powers allows for public participation in government).
18. THOMAS GOEBEL, A GOVERNMENT BY THE PEOPLE: DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA,

1890-1940 1 (2002) (citing T.V. Smith, The Voice of the People, 169 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC.
SCI. 101, 109 (1933)) (emphasis added).
19. Clayton P. Gillette, Is Direct Democracy Anti-Democratic?,34 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 609, 618
(1998). Some have argued that the Constitution was "full of restrictions on the exercise of the popular
will" because it was "primarily shaped by the interests of a small property-holding elite" and that its
"built-in checks and balances were directed at perpetuating unequal social and political relations by
frustrating the efforts of the people to liberate themselves from the dominance of particular interests."
GOEBEL, supra note 18, at 54.
20. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 51 (James Madison) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005).
21. Id.
22. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4; see also CHARLES SUMNER LOBINGIER, THE PEOPLE'S LAW 137-87
(1909) (describing origin and development of state constitutions during revolutionary era). The
Federalist papers also describe advantages of the proposed republican form of government and the
evils that the Framers intended to protect citizens from and avoid. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10,
at 52-54 (James Madison) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005) (discussing advantages to republican form of
government as opposed to pure democracy); THE FEDERALIST No. 55, at 303-04 (Alexander Hamilton
or James Madison) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005) (discussing republican government principles in relation to
number of representatives); THE FEDERALIST No. 63, at 339-43 (Alexander Hamilton or James
Madison) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005) (discussing need for senate in representative republican government).
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 ("The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members
chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have
the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.").
24. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. This portion of the Constitution provides:
Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of
Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State
may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or Representative, or Person holding an
Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.
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25
same legislative bodies, rather than the people, directly elected senators.
Finally, even amendments to the Constitution required approval, not of the
electorate, but of state legislatures. The process used to implement the
Constitution provided the only exception. The Founders decided that citizens,
rather than their legislators, must ratify the Constitution, because no state
government could control this decision for the people. 26 Even this choice only
allowed limited democracy, however, because instead of using today's practice of
limited citizen
allowing all electors to vote in a mass referendum, the Founders
27
input to electing representatives to constitutional conventions.

Id. For the first eight elections, between the years 1789 and 1820, there was no popular vote at all for
the President. Nat'l Archives & Records Admin., Historical Election Results: Electoral College Box
Scores 1789-1996, http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/electoral-college/scores.html (last visited
Feb. 1, 2007). With the exception of four elections, the candidate with the most popular votes or the
most Electoral College votes has won the presidency. Social Studies for Kids, The Electoral College,
http://www.socialstudiesforkids.com/articles/government/theelectoralcollege.htm (last visited Feb. 1,
2007). In the 1800 election, Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr received equal numbers of Electoral
College votes, and Jefferson won the election by a vote in the House of Representatives. Id. In the
election of 1824, Andrew Jackson received the most electoral votes of any candidate. Id.He did not
receive the required number of electoral votes to win, however. Id. A House of Representatives vote
decided the election in favor of John Quincy Adams. Id. In the 1876 election, Samuel Tilden initially
won a greater number of electoral votes, but a congressional commission awarded Rutherford B.
Hayes twenty disputed electoral votes, giving Hayes the 185 votes necessary at the time to win the
election. Social Studies for Kids, supra. Most recently, in 2000, George W. Bush won the presidential
election by carrying the Electoral College, even though his opponent Al Gore won the popular vote by
more than 500,000 ballots. David Stout, The Final Tally: Gore's Lead in the PopularVote Now Exceeds
500,000, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2000, at All.
25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3 ("The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators
from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six Years; and each Senator shall have one
Vote."). Note how this changed in 1913 with the Seventeenth Amendment, which provided for the
popular election of Senators:
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, elected
by the people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have one vote. The electors in
each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of
the State legislatures.
Id. amend. XVII. Following the worldwide trend toward greater democratization, the British House of
Commons recently voted to develop laws to convert the Parliament's upper chamber, the House of
Lords, from "a mix of unelected and hereditary appointees" to elected representatives voted in by the
people. This shift could "potentially [be] one of the most significant constitutional changes in British
history." David Stringer, Britain moves toward making Lords run for office, DAILY BREEZE
(TORRANCE, CAL.), Mar. 8,2007, at A15.

26. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 849 n.2 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)); see also THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT
DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 12-20 (1989) (discussing

both Framer's acceptance that government must have the consent of governed to be legitimate and
Framer's distrust of direct democracy on large scale); FERLING, supra note 2, at 155 (discussing how
Jefferson wrote that Framers intended to form a limited national government that left people to
govern themselves within each state).
27. See Robert Rutland, Ratification of the Constitution, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 2118, 2118 (Leonard Levy & Kennneth Karst eds., 2d ed. 2000) (discussing Madison's
proposal to avoid state government input by having Congress send plans directly to people for
ratification).
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Thus, even though democratic ideals inspired the Founding Fathers, in
form, the original United States government relied little on direct rule by the
people. The Founders consciously chose a representative model that effectively
checked even the limited voting rights of citizens. A limited electorate could vote
for members of the House of Representatives, but the House could not
implement laws without approval of the Senate or the signature by the President,
28
neither of which the people directly elected.
B.

Citizen Participationat the National Level through the Petition Clause

Although it appeared nowhere in the Constitution, the federal system of
government originally did contain some semblance of direct democracy. During
the ratification process, opponents criticized the Constitution's failure to protect
individual rights. One of the most important omissions concerned the longestablished right to petition the government. Petitioning was popular as a
process for citizen participation in federal law. In England and colonial America,
"petitions were a major source for legislative initiatives. ''29 Petitioning "enjoyed

28. The franchise to vote has also been expanded. Initially, the vote was "reserved to white
English-speaking literate males, a majority of whom belonged to the respectable classes."
ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE
UNITED STATES 316 (2000). It now includes most citizens over eighteen years of age including females,

minorities, and representatives of all economic groups. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (declaring all
natural born and naturalized persons in United States to be citizens, prohibiting states from abridging
citizens' privileges or denying to any citizens equal protection of the laws, and penalizing states'
representation level in Congress if states deny voting rights to any male citizen twenty-one or older);
id. amend. XV, § 1 (prohibiting denial or abridgement of voting rights "on account of race, color, or
previous conditions of servitude"); id. amend. XIX (prohibiting denial or abridgement of voting rights
"on account of sex"); id. amend. XXVI, § 1 (prohibiting denial or abridgement of voting rights of
citizens eighteen or older "on account of age"). Some variation exists from state to state about the
eligibility of felons to vote. See Developments in the Law-The Law of Prisons, 115 HARV. L. REV.
1838, 1942-49 (2002) (indicating that, as of date of article, eight states permanently disenfranchised all
felons absent gubernatorial pardon or restoration order, five states permanently disenfranchised large
categories of felons, thirty-five states had regimes varying based on number and severity of offenses,
and two allowed convicts to vote while incarcerated).
29. Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Downsizing the Right to Petition, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 739, 750
(1999). The petitioning process "originated more bills in pre-constitutional America than any other
source of legislation." Stephen Higginson, A Short History of the Right to Petition Government for the
Redress of Grievances, 96 YALE L.J. 142, 144 (1986). For example, in the early 1700s, over half of the
statutes in Virginia and Connecticut originated from petitions to the government. Id. at 144 n.63. In
Virginia, the number of petitions more than doubled in the latter half of the eighteenth century.

Norman B. Smith, "Shall Make No Law Abridging...": An Analysis of the Neglected, but Nearly
Absolute, Right of Petition, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 1153, 1171-72 (1986) (citing RAYMOND C. BAILEY,
POPULAR INFLUENCE UPON PUBLIC POLICY: PETITIONING IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY VIRGINIA 32
(1979)). Similarly, in 1770, Connecticut's General Assembly acted on over 150 petitions and created
only fifteen laws on its own initiative. Higginson, supra, at 144 n.63; see also STAFF OF H. COMM. ON
ENERGY & COMMERCE, 99TH CONG., 2D SESS., PETITIONS, MEMORIALS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS
SUBMITrED FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF CONGRESS, MARCH 4, 1789 TO DECEMBER 14, 1795, at 1 n.3
(Comm. Print 1986) (hereinafter PETITIONS, MEMORIALS] (noting major impact of petitions on federal
legislation during 1790s).
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its apex in America" in the late eighteenth century, 30 and by 1795, "'[t]he
principal part of [Congress's] time [was] taken up in reading and referring
petitions."' 31 Petitions served as a "tool of democratic mass politics" '32 and were
33
"the most widespread means for popular participation in the political process."
They were valuable to create "political dramas and highlight legislative
34
deadlocks ... [that prevented] popularly-initiated deliberation on grievances."

Groups produced floods of citizen petitions to voice their opinions on issues such
as the creation of a National Bank, the treatment of the Cherokees in Georgia,
35
and the criminalization of dueling.
The first Congress addressed the right to petition when it passed the Bill of
Rights to mollify critics of the Constitution. Madison's original format for the
Bill of Rights listed the right to petition and the rights to free speech and press in
two separate sections. Ultimately the Framers combined both in the same
amendment 36 and included the right to "petition the Government for a redress of
grievances" in the Bill of Rights 37 "virtually without comment" because it was so
38
well established.

30. Lawson & Seidman, supra note 29, at 750-51 ("The practice of petitioning flourished in the
fledgling national legislature. In the late eighteenth century, petitioning may well have enjoyed its
apex in America, embracing both individual and collective written requests to the executive,
legislative, and judicial branches.").
31. David C. Frederick, John Quincy Adams, Slavery, and the Disappearanceof the Right of
Petition, 9 LAW & HIST. REV. 113, 117 (1991) (quoting Letter from John Fenno, U.S. Senate printer, to
Joseph Ward (Dec. 25, 1795)).
32. Gregory A. Mark, The Vestigial Constitution: The History and Significance of the Right to
Petition, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2153,2160 (1998).
33. PETITIONS, MEMORIALS, supra note 29, at 6.
34. Mark, supra note 32, at 2161.
35. Higginson, supra note 29, at 156-57. Higginson elaborates:
Indeed, in Congress' first decades petitions were received and considered, typically by
referral to committees. The petition-response mechanism dealt procedurally with such
controversial issues as contested election results, the National Bank, the expulsion of
Cherokees from Georgia, land distribution, the abolition of dueling, government in the
territories, the Alien and Sedition Acts, and the slave trade. Generally, favorable legislation
or an adverse report halted further petitioning.
Id.; accord Frederick, supra note 31, at 130 (citing G. BARNES, THE ANTISLAVERY IMPULSE: 18301844, at 114 (1933)) (noting that establishment of National Bank, Cherokee expulsion, cessation of
Sunday postal service, and other matters of substantial public interest had yielded floods of petitions).
36. See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 716 (1971) (Black, J., concurring)
(detailing separate clauses originally proposed by Madison). For the full text of Madison's proposal,
see 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 766 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834), reprinted in 2 THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1095-96 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1971)

[hereinafter BILL OF RIGHTS

HISTORY].

37. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.").
38. Higginson, supra note 29, at 155-56; see also 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 766 (Joseph Gales ed.,
1834), reprinted in BILL OF RIGHTS HISTORY, supra note 36, at 1095-96 (providing comprehensive

review of house debates regarding inclusion of Petition Clause in Bill of Rights). During the House
debates, Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts argued:
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By the late 1790s, Congress developed procedures for reading and referring
petitions to committees, which would report on them. 39 Although review of the
petitions did not necessarily mean Congress would act favorably, "the process
reflected the seriousness of petitions. '40 The public petition largely fell into
disuse, however, as a consequence of the conflict over slavery. Abolitionists used
the Petition Clause to pressure Congress into considering measures designed to
eliminate slavery. 41 Congress spent so much time debating the emancipation
issues raised in petitions that it could not carry on other business. 42 Furthermore,
because the House heard petitions from Northern states before those from
Southern ones, time often ran out before petitions from Southerners could be
heard. 43 In May of 1836, in an attempt to quell the debate, the House changed its
44
internal procedures by passing a "gag rule" that tabled all antislavery petitions.
Concerned about the constitutionality of rejecting citizen petitions,
Congress amended its rules again in 1844 to repeal the gag rule. 45 This repeal,
however, did not restore petitions to their previous status as serious agendaI hope we shall never shut our ears against that information which is to be derived from the
petitions and instructions of our constituents. I hope we shall never presume to think that all
the wisdom of this country is concentred [sic] within the walls of this House. Men,
unambitious of distinctions from their fellow-citizens, remain within their own domestic
walk, unheard of and unseen, possessing allthe advantages resulting from a watchful
observance of public men and public measures, whose voice, if we would descend to listen to
it, would give us knowledge superior to what could be acquired amidst the cares and bustles
of a public life; let us then adopt the amendment, and encourage the diffident to enrich our
stock of knowledge with the treasure of their remarks and observations.
Id.
39. Frederick, supra note 31, at 118.
40. Mark, supra note 32, at 2160.
41. Frederick, supra note 31, at 119.
42. "With each succeeding resolution condemning [abolition], the number of petitions multiplied
to the point that normal House business became difficult, on occasion impossible." Id. at 130; see also
id. at 123-25 (discussing various representatives' proposals to stem the tide of abolition petitions).
43. Id. at 128 (noting that "the accepted House procedure for considering petitions [was for t]he
petitions [to be] presented by states geographically, starting with Maine and proceeding south and
then west," and therefore Southerners rarely had "an opportunity to present petitions from their own
constituents"). The procedure has changed such that petitions are now called alphabetically by
representative's name instead of by state. 4 ASIER C. HINDS, HINDS' PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES § 3313, at 265 (1907).

44. 12 REG. DEB. 4052 (1836) (resolving, on May 26, 1836, that House of Representatives would
indefinitely table all petitions regarding slavery or its abolition). This solution was never popular;
when proposed previously, it had prompted former President John Quincy Adams, then serving as
representative from Massachusetts, to comment, "Well, sir, you begin with suppressing the right of
petition; you must next suppress the right of speech in this House ....
" 12 REG. DEB. 2002 (1835).
45. Michael Kent Curtis, The Curious History of Attempts to Suppress Antislavery Speech, Press,
and Petition in 1835-37,89 Nw. U. L. REV. 785,848-49 (1995). Professor Curtis relates:
To many Congressmen, as Adams put it, the resolution was "a direct violation of the
constitution of the United States... and the rights of my constituents." As predicted by
many, both in and out of Congress, the gag rule became a cause celebre, and the abolitionists
made the most of it. Adams conducted brilliant guerilla warfare against it until it was finally
abandoned in 1844.
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setting tools. 46 Under the 1844 rule, the entire House no longer considered
petitions. Instead, the House simply received a petition and then referred it to a
committee where it would "sleep the sleep of death. ' 47 Thus, the procedure
eviscerated the right to petition because "there was little real difference between
rejecting petitions and referring them to a committee that refused to issue a
report." 48
C.

Direct Democracy at the State Level

In contrast to the federal government, the American states more quickly
embraced direct democracy. The colonial practice of using direct citizen input
predated the founding of the United States. 49 Furthermore, as colonies
transitioned to states, they asked their citizens to ratify the process; all but one
50
state subjected their constitutions to a popular vote.
In creating legislation, however, state governments, like their federal
counterpart, initially eschewed notions of direct democracy. Instead, every state
employed a system of representative democracy through a state legislature. 51
Although a handful of states allowed citizens the right to instruct their
legislators, 52 none of the original state constitutions contained a process for a
53
direct vote by citizens through a statewide initiative or referendum process.

46. Currently, the government does the minimum: the presenter endorses the petition and then
submits it to the Clerk for entry on the Congressional Journal and printing in the Congressional
Record. RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES R. XII § 3, availableat

http://clerk.house.gov/legislative/rules/rule12.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2007).
47. 11 REG. DEB. 1137 (1835) (speech of Rep. John Dickson of New York (quoting Psalms 13:3)).
48. Frederick, supra note 31, at 127. As Representative Slade of Vermont said scornfully of
petitions regarding slavery being delayed indefinitely by referral to a committee that would not issue a
report, "The sacred right of petition!-that is to say, the 'sacred right' of being 'nailed to the table,' ...
or the 'sacred right' of being gathered.., into the 'family vault of all the Capulets."' 12 REG. DEB.
2043 (1835).
49. Referendums date as far back as the Mayflower Treaty in 1620. Bruno Kaufmann & M. Dane
Waters, Introduction to DIRECT DEMOCRACY INEUROPE: A COMPREHENSIVE REFERENCE GUIDE TO
THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM PROCESS IN EUROPE, at xix, xix (Bruno Kaufmann & M. Dane

Waters eds., 2004) [hereinafter DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE].
50. While the Federal Constitution was ratified by conventions instead of a general vote, all
eligible citizens in Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts directly decided on their state
constitutions by participating in referendums. FREDERIC JESUP STIMSON, POPULAR LAW-MAKING 297

(1910) (noting: "for no constitution, with the exception of that of Virginia, has ever been adopted in
any of our States except by the people at an election"). All states after 1910 have also adopted their
state constitutions by a popular vote, and even Virginia submitted its constitution to a vote of the
people in 1970. Constitutions of the Several States, http://www.thegreenpapers.com/slg/
constitution.phtml#AL (last visited Feb. 3, 2007).
51. At the state and local level, citizens of every state who were fortunate enough to have the
franchise could vote directly for their state legislators. Furthermore, in New England, citizens could
initiate laws at the local level in town meetings. M. DANE WATERS, INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM
ALMANAC 3 (2003).

52. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 685-792 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834), reprintedin BILL OF RIGHTS HISTORY,
supra note 36, at 1095 (statement of Rep. Burke of South Carolina). "[T]he constitutions of
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and North Carolina, all of them recognise, in express terms, the right of
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Dissatisfaction with an entirely representative form of government began
during the Progressive era in the late 1800s. 54 The Progressives turned away from
legislatures controlled by special interests. 55 They proposed the citizen-initiated
referendum as an alternative mechanism for creating laws-a means of
circumventing legislatures rather than working with them. 56 The Progressives
argued that referendums could correct the control of government by moneyed
interests and could force action when elected officials became "paralyzed by
inaction." 57 As Woodrow Wilson characterized it, the citizen-initiated
58
referendum was the "gun behind the door" of the legislature.
In the late 1890s, the Progressives introduced the initiative process in the
United States as part of their reform platform.5 9 In 1898, South Dakota became
the first state to allow statewide popular referendums. 6° Between 1898 and 1918,
twenty-three states followed South Dakota's lead and adopted either a statewide

the people to give instruction to their representatives." Id. at 1103. Maryland may also have allowed
this right, Id.
53. See WATERS, supra note 51, at 3 (describing late nineteenth century realization that
electorate could not "reign in an out of touch government"). Initiatives can come in two forms: direct
initiative and indirect initiative. Direct initiative is a process by which constitutional amendments or
statutes proposed by the people are placed directly on the ballot without the assistance of state
legislatures. The ballot is submitted to voters for their approval or rejection. Indirect initiative is a
process by which a statute or amendment proposed by the people through a petition is submitted to
the state legislature during the legislative session. The legislature approves or modifies the proposed
legislation.
54. Id. at 3. In addition to the initiative and referendum process, the Progressive movement
sought a number of political reforms, including secret ballots, direct election of United States senators,
primary elections, and women's suffrage. GOEBEL, supra note 18, at 4.
55. WATERS, supra note 51, at 3; see GOEBEL, supra note 18, at 4 (noting that direct democracy

movement is typically interpreted as response to perceived influence of special interest groups on
legislatures). In California, the initiative was introduced to wrest control of the state government from
the Southern Pacific Company. See James E. Castello, Comment, The Limits of Popular Sovereignty:
Using the Initiative Power to Control Legislative Procedure, 74 CAL. L. REV. 491, 503 (1986)
(describing amendment of California constitution to authorize referendum and initiative immediately
following election of reform movement's "standard bearer" Hiram Johnson as governor).
56. See, e.g., Beall v. State, 103 A. 99, 102-03 (Md. 1917) (opining that Maryland and other states
amended their constitutions to provide for referendum veto of legislation in order to eliminate alleged
control and corruption by "great corporations" and political parties); State v. Howell, 181 P. 920, 922
(Wash. 1919) (opining that citizens asserted referendum power due to perception that legislature had
become unresponsive to popular will). One New Jersey reformer concluded that "representative
government is a failure." GOEBEL, supra note 18, at 36. On another occasion, supporters of direct
legislation by the electorate characterized representative government as an "utter failure. It fails in the
leaders it develops; it fails in its mechanism. It is cumbrous, uncertain, confused, irresponsible,
undemocratic, often farcical and dishonest, and commonly partisan." Id. at 207 n.35 (quoting DIRECT
LEGISLATION RECORD I (Nat'l Direct Legislation League), Oct. 1894, at 84).
57. WATERS, supra note 51, at 3.
58. GOEBEL, supra note 18, at 55.
59. CRONIN, supranote 26, at 50-51.
60. WATERS, supra note 51, at 4.
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legislative referendum process, citizen-initiated referendum process, or both.6 1
Massachusetts was the last state to adopt the process during this initial era.62
As the referendum process spread, challengers argued that it violated the
Guarantee Clause of the United States Constitution because direct democracy
did not qualify as a "republican form of government. '63 The Oregon Supreme
Court addressed the issue and disagreed, concluding that: "A republican form of
government is a government administered by representatives chosen or
appointed by the people or by their authority ....
The representative character
of the government still remains. The people have simply reserved to themselves
a larger share of legislative power.. .. "64
The United States Supreme Court thwarted any further challenges to the
referendum process when it found that it lacked jurisdiction over the matter in
Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon.65 The Pacific States Court
concluded that the issue was "political" and that Congress, not the Court, had
the discretion to decide whether a state had a "Republican Form" of
government. 66 Although the Court did not directly comment on the
Constitutionality of the referendum process, by allowing representative
government and direct democracy to coexist, the Court effectively resolved the
question.
For a time, referendums represented a phenomenon largely limited to the
West. 67 When Alaska joined the Union in 1959, its constitution included the right

61. These states included Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. Id. at 4,523-24.
62. Howard R. Ernst, The Historical Role of Narrow-MaterialInterests in Initiative Politics, in
DANGEROUS DEMOCRACY?: THE BATTLE OVER INrrIATIVES IN AMERICA 1, 10-11 (Larry J. Sabato et
al. eds., 2001) (discussing creation of initiative process throughout United States and explaining
Massachusetts's creation of ballot initiative in 1918).
63. The Constitution requires that: "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this
Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on
Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against
domestic Violence." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.

64. Kadderly v. City of Portland, 74 P. 710, 719-20 (Or. 1903). A similar conclusion was reached
by the Supreme Court of California, which held that:
[I]t is clear that the direct participation of the electors of subdivisions of a state in legislation
as to local affairs was never intended to be prohibited by the framers of the federal
Constitution, or the states adopting the same, and that such power has been exercised by
them, where not inconsistent with provisions of their state Constitution, in innumerable
instances, from the institution of our government to the present day, without interference of
any kind on the part of the federal government,
In re Pfhaler, 88 P. 270,273 (Cal. 1906).
65. 223 U.S. 118, 151 (1912).
66. Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co., 223 U.S. at 138.
67. See Robert Treat Paine, The Development of Direct Legislation in America, in THE
INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 92, 94-112 (William B. Munro ed., 1912) (describing early
development of direct legislation in America, with emphasis on western states). Note that President
Taft vetoed Arizona's entry into the union because of the judicial recall provision in Arizona's
constitution. GOEBEL, supra note 18, at 64. Arizonans deleted the provision, were admitted to the
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for citizens to enact statutes by initiative. 68 Illinois adopted the statewide
initiative in 1970, and Florida followed suit in 1972.69 In 1992, Mississippi became
70
the most recent state to adopt the process.
Currently, every state except Delaware provides for some form of direct
voting process in addition to the election of representatives. 7 1 Furthermore,
twenty-three states and the District of Columbia give their citizens some
opportunity to bypass their legislatures completely through citizen-initiated
72
referendums.
D.

Citizen Participationat the State Level through Referendums

Although the referendum process was popular in the early part of the
twentieth century when citizens used it extensively, this popularity declined
substantially from 1940 through 1960.73 In the 1970s, referendums experienced a
dramatic resurgence, which many credit initially to Proposition 13, the California
tax limitation initiative. 74 This resurgence continues today as the number of

Union, and then promptly voted the recall provision back into their constitution. Id. The character of
the West provides some explanation for why referendums where a phenomenon largely limited to that
region. See id. at 5 ("The [western] region was marked by weaker political parties, greater shifts in
voting behavior, stronger anti-party spirit, and more effective nonpartisan movements.").
68. ALASKA CONST. art. XI.
69. WATERS, supra note 51, at 526.
70. Id.
71. "At present forty-nine of the fifty states require that amendments to state constitutions be
submitted to a statewide vote." New Progressive Party v. Hernandez Colon, 779 F. Supp. 646, 659
(D.P.R. 1991) (citing James D. Gordon III & David B. Magleby, Pre-election Judicial Review of
Initiatives and Referendums, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 298, 298-99 (1989)). Delaware is the only state
that does not require statewide voting for state constitution changes. DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DIRECT
LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 36 (1984).
72. THOMAS M. DURBIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM AND RECALL: A
RESUME OF STATE PROVISIONS 1-2 (1981). The following allow some form of initiative: Alaska,
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, District of Columbia, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Maine,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. Id.; see also Nathaniel Persily,
The PeculiarGeography of Direct Democracy: Why the Initiative, Referendum and Recall Developed in
the American West, 2 MICH. L. & POL'Y REV. 11, 15-16 tbl.1 (1997) (noting that twenty-three states
have citizen-initiated referendums, or "initiatives," and twenty-five states have government-referred
referendums and listing the applicable states).
73. Charles M. Price, Initiative Qualifying in the States, 1898-1989. Variationsin Usage, FAM. LAW
& DEMOCRACY REP., Feb. 1990, at 4, 4. Thomas Goebel notes there were 246 ballot propositions in
the 1930s, only 146 in the 1940s, and a mere 85 in the 1960s. GOEBEL, supra note 18, at 186-88. The
number has grown steadily since the 1970s, however. Id. at 186-87; accord WATERS, supra note 51, at 7
(reporting that initiative use peaked at 293 from 1911 to 1920, with the two World Wars, the Great
Depression, and the Korean War contributing to a low of 87 from 1961 to 1970).
74. Jim Wasserman, Tax-busting Proposition 13 Still Robust at 25, WASH. TIMES, June 3, 2003, at
6A. Sixty-five percent of homeowners polled by the Public Policy Institute of California in February
2003 said the proposition was "mostly a good thing" for California. PUB. POL. INST. OF CAL., PPIC
STATEWIDE SURVEY: CALIFORNIANS AND THEIR GOVERNMENT 10 (2003), available at
http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/S_203MBS.pdf.
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measures on ballots for each decade since 1970 has steadily increased with each
75

decade exceeding the previous one.
In the midterm elections of 2006, American citizens voted on 204 statewide
initiatives and referendums in thirty-seven states. 76 The states that have most
used the referendum process are those with citizen-initiated referendums.
Oregon, California, Colorado, North Dakota, and Arizona lead the way in the
number of measures, and these five high-use states have accounted for nearly
sixty percent of all citizen-initiated referendums historically. 77 In some of the
high-use states, citizen-initiated referendums were the source of all significant
78
amendments to those states' constitutions.
III. DiREcr DEMOCRACY WORLDWIDE

In contrast to the United States, various European and Commonwealth
countries have a long history of referendums, both at the local and national
levels. Starting in Switzerland, a small democracy, the process spread to France,

Italy, and other large democracies. Today, numerous countries, including
Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Italy, Ireland, and Denmark include a system
for national referendums. 79 Referendums have also spread to Eastern Europe,
and "provisions for referendums have in different forms been included in all the
80
new constitutions in the new democracies in Eastern and Central Europe.

75. K.K. DuVivier, Out of the Bottle: The Genie of Direct Democracy, 70 ALBANY L. REV.
(forthcoming 2007).
76. Election Results 2006, BALLOTWATCH (Initiative & Referendum Inst., Univ. S. Cal.), Feb. 5,
2007, at 1, 1, http://iandrinstitute.org/BW%202006-5%20(Election%20results-update).pdf [hereinafter
Election Results 20061 (citing increase from 162 propositions in November 2004).
77. See Price, supra note 73, at 4 (comparing use of citizen-initiated referendums in the then
twenty-three states that allowed this form of referendum).
78. Richard B. Collins, How Democratic Are Initiatives?, 72 U. COLO. L. REv. 983, 983 (2001).
Collins based his observations, in part, on data collected by Dennis Polhill. ld at 983 n.2 (citing Dennis
Polhill, Are Coloradans Fit to Make Their Own Laws? A Common-Sense Primer on the Initiative
Process app. B at 16-33 (Independence Institute, Issue Paper No. 8-96, 1996) (summarizing election
results on all Colorado ballot issues, including constitutional amendments, from 1912 to 1995)); see
also CAL. COMM'N ON

CAMPAIGN

FIN., DEMOCRACY

BY INITIATIVE: SHAPING

CALIFORNIA'S

FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 13 tbl.5, 174-75, 179 tbl.5.1 (1992) (providing extensive history

and analysis of constitutional amendment initiatives in California); PHILIP L. DUBOIS & FLOYD
FEENEY, LAWMAKING BY INITIATIVE: ISSUES, OPTIONS AND COMPARISONS 30 (1998) (listing

initiatives on ballots, including those seeking constitutional amendments, from each state's adoption of
initiative process through 1996). But see Hans A. Linde, Taking Oregon's Initiative
Toward a New
Century, 34 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 391, 394-95 (1998) (expressing concern that, although initiatives
seeking constitutional amendments were once utilized by citizens to make changes in government,
such initiatives are increasingly used by moneyed special interests to preempt future legislation and
thereby displace representative government).
79. See Vernon Bogdanor, Western Europe, in REFERENDUMS AROUND THE WORLD, supra note
9, at 24, 26-27 (indicating that the following Western European countries mention referendums in their
constitutions: Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland).
80. MADS QVORTRUP, A

PEOPLE 1 (2002).

COMPARATIVE STUDY OF REFERENDUMS: GOVERNMENT BY THE
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Consequently, it is now Europe, rather than the United States, that has taken the
8
lead in the use of direct democracy at the national level. '
A.

History2

Many recognize Switzerland as the paradigm for direct citizen voting in
modern Western democracies,8 3 and Switzerland's process provided the model
84
for the initiative process introduced by the Progressives in the United States.

81. Lisbeth Kirk, Referendums on Worldwide Rise-With

Europe Taking the Lead,
see
also Bruno Kaufmann, A Comparative Evaluation of Initiative & Referendum in 32 European States, in
DIRECT DEMOCRACY INEUROPE, supra note 49, at 3, 3 (noting that Europe accounted for 301 of the
497 nationwide referendums held worldwide between 1991 and 2003); Todd Donovan, Expanding
Direct Democracy in the U.S,: How Far is Too Far? 1-3 (Feb. 16, 2002) (Paper Prepared for the
EUOBSERVER, Feb. 4, 2005, http://mailgate.supereva.com/europa/europa.novas/msg02829.html;

Democracy Symposium, Williamsburg, Virginia), available at http:lni4d.us/library/donovanpaper.pdf

[hereinafter Donovan, How Far] (asserting use and acceptance of direct democracy in Europe and
Oceania exceeds that in United States). For a comparison of the use of direct democracy in Canada,
New Zealand, and the United States, see generally Shaun Bowler, Todd Donovan & Jeffrey A. Karp,
When Might Institutions Change? Elite Support for Direct Democracy in Three Nations, 55 POL. RES.
Q. 731 (2002).
82. A comprehensive history of the referendum process in Europe is beyond the scope of this
Article. Readers seeking information beyond this brief summary may refer to the following works:
KRIS W. KOBACH, THE REFERENDUM: DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN SWITZERLAND (1993); SILVANO
MOCKLI, DIREKTE DEMOKRATIE: EIN INTERNATIONALER VERGLEICH (1994); MARKKU SUKSI,
BRINGING IN THE PEOPLE: A COMPARISON OF CONSTITUTIONAL FORMS AND PRACTICES OF THE
REFERENDUM (1993).
83. The Initiative and Referendum Institute Europe has created a "multimedia, multilingual"
CHDD Pocket Guide to Swiss Direct Democracy, billing it as a "comprehensive and reader-friendly

insight into the most experienced I&R country in the world." Bruno Kaufmann & M. Dane Waters,
What is the Initiative & Referendum Institute Europe?, in DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE, supra note
49, at ix, ix. As of 1993, Switzerland had held 414 nationwide referendums, and Australia had held only
44. Kris W. Kobach, Switzerland, in REFERENDUMS AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 9, at 98, 98 n.2
(noting also that principality of Liechtenstein shares Switzerland's obsession with referendums).
84. See, e.g., Numa Droz, Referendum In Switzerland, in SELECTED ARTICLES ON THE
INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM 66, 66 (Edith M. Phelps ed., 2d ed. 1911) [hereinafter SELECTED
ARTICLES] (cautioning that initiative right can lead to grave decisions being made on impulse); Albert
Bushnell Hart, Vox Populi In Switzerland, in SELECTED ARTICLES, supra, at 106, 108-09, 111
(expressing disappointment about Switzerland's underutilization of referendum to rebuke legislature
but cautioning that referendum leads to initiative and initiative is highly susceptible to abuse); Abbott
Lawrence Lowell, Referendum In Switzerland and in America, in SELECTED ARTICLES, supra, at 40,
40, 49 (decrying low voter turnout for referendums in Switzerland and declaring compulsory
referendum "entirely out of the question in America" and that advisory referendum likely to do more
harm than good); William D. McCrackan, Swiss Solutions Of American Problems, in SELECTED
ARTICLES, supra, at 75, 75-76, 79 (arguing that opponents of direct democracy are those who stand to
lose power and that adoption of referendum in the United States is much needed step toward actual
democracy); J.W. Sullivan, Referendum In Switzerland, in SELECTED ARTICLES, supra, at 60, 60-63, 65
(arguing that advisory referendums can be abused by political parties but that binding referendums
have "scotched the politician" throughout Switzerland and in some places "buried him"); Louis
Wuarin, Recent PoliticalExperiments In The Swiss Democracy, in SELECTED ARTICLES, supra, at 9, 910 (arguing Swiss experience shows that laws rejected by referendum are often successfully revised by
legislature thereafter and that fears about initiative abuse proved unfounded); see also DAVID S.
BRODER, DEMOCRACY DERAILED: INITIATIVE CAMPAIGNS AND THE POWER OF MONEY 1, 26 (2000)
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Switzerland's first recorded decision by direct vote of citizens occurred more
than 700 years ago. 85 The first referendums started in 1449 with votes about war
taxes and permission to enter alliances.8 6 Although Swiss "referendums fell
victim to tyranny and temporarily disappeared in the 1700s," Jean-Jacques
Rousseau, a citizen of Geneva, reawakened democratic ideals in The Social
Contract.87 Influenced by Rousseau and the French Revolution, Swiss citizens
used their new constitution of 1848 to transform the direct voting process into a
national institution. 88 Since that time, the Swiss have held more than five
hundred nationwide referendums, 89 more nationwide referendums "than all
other countries combined." 9
A number of French cities employed the referendum device as early as
1552.91 Inspired by Rousseau and the revolution, the French inserted provisions
for referendums on constitutional matters, as well as a nationwide right of citizen
initiative, into their constitution of 1793. 92 Napoleon, however, exploited the
referendum process when he used it not to forward democratic government, but

(describing introduction of initiative and petition by those witnessing Swiss system); RICHARD J.
ELLIS, DEMOCRATIC DELUSIONS: THE INITIATIVE PROCESS IN AMERICA 28-29 (2002) (discussing
Swiss initiative model as basis for United States system); DAVID D. SCHMIDT, CITIZEN LAWMAKERS:
THE BALLOT INITIATIVE REVOLUTION 5 (1989) (noting United States initiative based on Swiss system
introduced in Zurich in 1860s).
85. In 1294, all male citizens of the canton of Schwyz who had the status to vote were allowed to
set policy at the annual sovereign assembly. Kobach, supra note 83, at 99.
86. "The first Swiss referendum was held in 1449 when the government of Berne (then an
independent Swiss state) asked its citizens to approve a special tax to pay off debts from an earlier
war." JOHN T. ROURKE ET AL., DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 32 (1992). In
1513, "[t]he government agreed ...not to enter alliances without the consent of the landsgemeinde
(the canton's active, enfranchised citizens), and in 1531 it further agreed not to go to war prior to
obtaining the people's permission by referendum." Id.
87. Id. at 32; see also Kaufmann & Waters, supra note 49, at xix (stating that Rousseau "described
popular sovereignty as a counter-weight to the absolute power of kings and emperors"). See generally
JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT OR PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL RIGHT (Charles

M. Sherover trans., 1984) (1762) (arguing citizens' willing relinquishment of natural liberty in favor of
civil liberty to be guaranteed by responsive government is basis of any free society).
88. ROURKE ET AL., supra note 86, at 32; see also Kaufmann & Waters, supra note 49, at xix
(noting that an obligatory constitutional referendum was introduced in Swiss Constitution of 1848).
89. Kirk, supra note 81 (noting that, according to the Initiative & Referendum Institute Europe,
Switzerland has held 531 national popular votes since 1848).
90. Kobach, supra note 83, at 98. For a comprehensive list of nationwide referendums for every
country in the world from 1793 to 1993, see REFERENDUMS AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 9, app.
A at 265-95.
91. ROURKE ET AL., supra note 86, at 31.

92. Kaufmann & Waters, supra note 49, at xix. Specifically, the 1793 French Constitution
provided:
If, in one-half of the departments plus one, one-tenth of the regularly constituted primary
assemblies requests the revision of a Constitutional Act or the amendment of some of its
articles, the Legislative Body shall be required to convoke all the primary assemblies of the
Republic to ascertain if there are grounds for a National Convention.
1793 CONST., availableat http://chnm.gmu.edu/revolution/d/430/.
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to curb the legislature and to legitimize his dictatorial powers. 93 Not until 1962,
when Charles de Gaulle submitted a referendum to the French people that
requested support for election of the President by a direct vote of the people, did
the referendum process take on new life in France. 94 France expanded the
referendum power in the Fifth Republic Constitution 95 and has become one of
the five most frequent users of the referendum process.
Italy also has made extensive use of referendums. First, it "held a series of
votes in the 1860s in which various provinces decided their future national
identity." 96 Italy's current referendum provision was added in its 1947
Constitution. 97 While the French had used referendums "to legitimize strong
leadership," 98 the Italian process promoted an opposite result. As a counterpoint
against a controlling Fascist regime, the Italians created a strong Parliament, but
they added the referendum power as a way for the people to rein in the
Parliament. 99 Although the Italians have initiated no referendums under the
Italian Constitution's primary referendum provisions, 1t° they have voted on
numerous referendums under an alternative section of their constitution that
0
provides for a popular veto of parliamentary legislation.1 '

93. ROURKE ET AL., supra note 86, at 32; Bogdanor, supra note 79, at 47-48; Kaufmann &
Waters, supra note 49, at xix.
94. Bogdanor, supra note 79, at 48-49. Prior to de Gaulle's proposal, the French presidency was
determined by an "electoral college composed of local notables." Id. at 48.
95. Id. at 49. Article 3 of the Fourth Republic Constitution (1946) used the referendum with
regard to "constitutional matters," declaring that "in all other matters, the people shall exercise
[sovereignty] through their deputies in the National Assembly." Id. In contrast, the Fifth Republic
Constitution (1958 and currently in force) "provided for the referendum to be used not only for
constitutional amendments but also for certain ordinary, non-constitutional bills." Id. Specifically, the
1958 Constitution states:
The President of the Republic may, on a proposal from the Government..., submit to a
referendum any government bill which deals with the organization of the public
authorities.... Where the referendum decides in favour of the government bill, the
President of the Republic shall promulgate it ....
1958 CONST. art. 11; see also id. art. 53 (dealing with amendment of constitution and declaring "no
cession, exchange or addition of territory shall be valid without the consent of the population
concerned").
96. ROURKE ET AL., supra note 86, at 31-32 ("British analyst Philip Goodhart argues that 'it is
fair to say that the modem state of Italy was built by a series of referendums' and quotes Italian
statesman Conte di Cavour's characterization of the Italian 'Dukes, Archdukes, and Grand Dukes' as
having 'been buried under the pile of ballots deposited in the electoral urns."').
97. Bogdanor, supra note 79, at 61-62.
98. Id. at 61.
99. Id. at 61-62.
100. See COST. art. 138 (requiring all constitutional amendments to be finally approved by
referendum); id. art. 132 (stating petition requirements for mergers and separations of nation's
regions).
101. See COST. art. 75 ("A popular referendum shall be held to abrogate, totally or partially, a
law or an act having the force of law, when requested by five hundred thousand electors or five
Regional Councils."); see also Bogdanor, supra note 79, at 62 (noting Italy has become most frequent
user of referendums among Western democracies, particularly referendums under Article 75).
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Few countries have matched Switzerland's use of referendums, but Ireland
and Denmark turned to the process extensively in the twentieth century. 1°2 The
1915 Constitution of Denmark required the people to vote directly on all
constitutional amendments. 0 3 Furthermore, Denmark's 1953 Constitution
contains an additional provision that permits one-third of its legislature to put an
enacted law to a vote, allowing the people to reject it. 1°4
With the creation of the Irish Free State, the 1922 Irish Constitution
contained provisions for national initiatives and referendums. 10 5 Some speculate
that the Irish included these innovative provisions because of the renewed
interest in direct democracy after World War 1.106 The 1937 Constitution
somewhat limited these rights, 10 7 yet it did permit the Irish people to vote on
ratification of the new constitution, which still contains provisions for
10 8
constitutional and legislative referendums.
Despite a long history of direct democracy in Western Europe, Eastern
Europe has only recently seen the most prodigious expansion in the use of
referendums. With seventeen nationwide referendums before 1987, and thirty-

102. Bogdanor, supra note 79, at 87. Sweden amended its constitution in 1922 to allow for
"optional advisory referendums at the discretion of the government." Id. at 70.
103. Palle Svensson, Denmark: The Referendum as Minority Protection, in THE REFERENDUM
EXPERIENCE IN EUROPE, supra note 9, at 33-34 ("The 1915 constitution introduced the mandatory
referendum as a part of the procedure for constitutional amendments .... [Ain amendment proposal when passed by parliament and afterwards by the newly elected parliament - had to be submitted to
the voters for approval or rejection.").
104. RIGEs GRUNDLOV [Constitution] § 42 (Den.); Bogdanor, supra note 79, at 72.
105. In 1922, Article 47 stated:
Such a Bill shall in accordance with regulations to be made by the [entire legislature] be
submitted by Referendum to the decision of the people if demanded before the expiration of
the ninety days either by a resolution of [the senate] assented to by three-fifths of the
members of [the senate], or by a petition signed by not less than one-twentieth of the voters
then on the register of voters, and the decision of the people by a majority of the votes
recorded on such Referendum shall be conclusive.
Ir. CONST., 1922, art. 47.

106. Bogdanor, supra note 79, at 78.
107. The 1937 Constitution restricted the use of referendums almost exclusively to constitutional
amendment and abolished completely the 1922 provision that allowed initiatives on a petition from
one-twentieth of the electorate. Bogdanor, supra note 79, at 79.
108. Article 46 of the 1937 Constitution addresses the constitutional referendum:
Every proposal for an amendment of this Constitution shall be initiated in Diil Eireann as a
Bill, and shall upon having been passed or deemed to have been passed by both Houses of
the Oireachtas, be submitted by Referendum to the decision of the people in accordance
with the law for the time being in force relating to the Referendum.
Ir. CONST., 1937, art. 46. Article 27 addresses legislative referendum and has never been used. See id.
art. 27 (allowing joint resolution by one-third of lower house of legislature and majority of upper
house to petition President to submit bills other than constitutional amendments to referendum); Basil
Chubb, Government and Ddil: Constitutional Myth and Political Practice, in DEVALERA'S
CONSTITUTION AND OURS 93, 98 (Brian Farrell ed., 1988) ("'If there is one thing more than another
that is clear and shining through this whole Constitution,' declared Eamon DeValera, on.
recommending Ireland's 1937 Constitution to the electorate, 'it is the fact that the people are the
masters."').
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three between 1987 and 1993,109 the Eastern European countries may rival all
but Switzerland in their use of the tool." t0 The Soviet regime frequently
manipulated the process,"' but referendums on sovereignty of the republics
"opened the floodgates for more referendums.""12 Between 1990 and 1994, the
fifteen former Soviet republics held at least ten referendums to approve
constitutions or deal with difficult issues. 113 Furthermore, although former
communist countries have not reached "[a]greement on the appropriate role of
the referendum" 114 over half of their constitutions contain provisions for
15
allowing some form of direct citizen vote.
In the twentieth century, direct voting has also spread geographically and
has increased strikingly on a worldwide scale."t 6 The practice extended to
Australia in 1906 and New Zealand in 1911.117 In 1947, the Philippines became
the first Asian country to use the system. 18 Referendums also have been used in
109. Henry E. Brady & Cynthia S. Kaplan, Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, in
REFERENDUMS AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 9, at 174, 176,179.
110. Although direct comparisons of comparable periods are difficult to find, according to at
least one chart of referendums since 1940, none of the countries but Switzerland exceeded the Eastern
European total of fifty. Morel, supra note 11, at 52 tbl.2.2.
111. See, e.g., Brady & Kaplan, supra note 109, at 182 (stating that results were "faked" on vote
in June 1946 when majority of citizens voted to retain Senate, but government announced opposite
result, stating citizens had voted to abolish the institution). For other examples, see id. at 176-84.
112. Id. at 192; see also id. at 184-202 (describing several subsequent referendums in former
Soviet republics).*
113. Id. at 202; see also Brady & Kaplan, supra note 109, at 211 tbls.6-8 (listing referendums
including Poland's vote on abortion in November 1992 (which Parliament rejected) and Romania's
January 1990 vote on the death penalty).
114. Stephen White & Ronald J. Hill, Russia, the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe: The
Referendum as a Flexible Political Instrument, in THE REFERENDUM EXPERIENCE IN EUROPE, supra

note 9, at 153,168.
115. See, e.g., POHISEADUS art. 105 (Est.) (granting parliament right to put draft legislation or
other national issues to referendum); A MAGYAR KOZTARSASAG ALKOTMANYA arts. 19, 30, 44

(Hung.) (allowing parliament to call a plebiscite and providing that local government shall be managed
by elected officials and through plebiscite); SATVERSME arts. 74-80 (Lat.) (providing that all
constitutional amendments are subject to referendum confirmation and allowing citizens to submit
constitutional amendment to parliament with sufficient participation); KONSTITUCIJA arts. 9, 147
(Lith.) (providing that "most significant issues" will be decided by referendum, either on declaration
of parliament or on request of at least 300,000 voters, the same number required to propose
amendment to constitution); KONSTYTUCJA art. 125 (Pol.) (allowing referendums to be held on
matters of particular importance to the state); CONSTITUIA arts. 2, 90, 147 (Rom.) (stating
referendums are central to national sovereignty and may be called for matters of national interest or
concerning a constitutional amendment); 6STAVA arts. 93.1, 93.2 (Slovk.) (stating referendums will be
used to confirm constitutional law entering into alliances or other important issues of public life);
OSTAVA art. 170 (Slovn.) (requiring confirmation referendum for constitutional amendments if
"required by at least thirty deputies"); see also INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM MONITOR 2004/2005, at 59 (Bruno Kaufmann ed.) (noting all foregoing constitutions allowed citizens to vote on accession to the
European Union and some allow referendums on other measures).
116. Butler & Ranney, supra note 9, at 4.
117. Colin A. Hughes, Australia and New Zealand, in REFERENDUMS AROUND THE WORLD,
supra note 9, at 154, 154-55.
118. REFERENDUMS AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 9, app. A at 278-79.
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South America and Africa, with Cameroon, Ghana, and South Africa all holding
nationwide referendum elections in 1960.119 Currently, every continent of the
world, with the exception of Antarctica, contains at least one country that has
held at least one nationwide referendum in the last hundred years. In this tally,
Mexico and Canada represent North America; 120 the United States remains one
of the only major democracies in the world that has yet to hold a nationwide
referendum.
B.

Increased Use of Referendums

In addition to its geographic spread, the frequency of referendum use has
also increased considerably. In the last fifty years, the number of national
referendums in Western Europe alone, excluding Switzerland, went from seven
in the 1950s to fifty-two in the 1990s.12 1 Countries that never had allowed their
citizens to vote directly in the past "have resorted to [the referendum] device in
recent years."' 122 Scotland, Northern Ireland, and Wales have held at least six
national referendums, despite the United Kingdom's "tradition of constrained
popular democracy," 12 3 and despite its characterization by some as an "elective
dictatorship."' 124 While some attribute this rise to unique events, such as the
1 5
expansion of the European Union, 2 others believe it represents a "more lasting
12 6
attitudes."'
shift in political

The shift worldwide toward more democratization has likewise expanded
the use of direct voting. The number of national measures has more than

119. Id. at 273-77, 280-82.
120. Canada held a nationwide referendum in 1942 concerning military conscription and again in
1992 to approve a constitutional accord. Id. at 280. Mexico has held thirteen national votes since 1863.
RES. CTR. ON DIREcT DEMOCRACY, UNIV. OF GENEVA, http://c2d.unige.ch/?lang=en (follow
hyperlink "World"; select "Mexico" from "Entity List"; then follow hyperlink "Votes List") (last
visited Feb. 5, 2007).
121. Morel, supra note 11, at 50. During this same time period, the total for Australia and New
Zealand went from two to nine. Id.
122. QVORTRUP, supra note 80, at 1.

123. Donovan, How Far, supra note 81, at 1; see also Anupam Chander, Note, Sovereignty,
Referenda, and the Entrenchment of a United Kingdom Bill of Rights, 101 YALE L.J. 457, 457-59, 47580 (1991) (discussing potential role of referendums in making "higher law" in the United Kingdom,
where legislature is unconstrained by codified constitution).
124. DIREcr DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE, supra note 49, at 39.

125. E.g., Kaufmann, supra note 81, at 3 (attributing "direct-democratic wave" to EU integration
process).
126. Matthew Mendelsohn & Andrew Parkin, Introduction: Referendum Democracy, in
REFERENDUM DEMOCRACY, supra note 11, at 1, 6. But cf DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE, supra
note 49, at 43 (noting that British citizens do not have a statutory right of referendum). "'I could not
consent to the introduction into our national life of a device so alien to all our traditions as the
referendum."' Id. (quoting Clement Attlee, British Prime Minister 1945-1951). Mendelsohn and
Parkin observed that Attlee's outlook may still hold true in the United Kingdom, stating: "The Labour
government has promised future referendums on conversion to the Euro, English regional assemblies,
the future of Gibraltar, and voting systems/proportional representation. These Referendums were
promised in 1997, but there has been no action to date." Mendelsohn & Parkin, supra, at 6.
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doubled worldwide during the last decade. 127 When the Soviet Union collapsed,
the new states in Eastern Europe used referendums "to legitimize the
declarations of independence and the constitutions of the newly independent
states. ' 128 Furthermore, the increase of the referendum rate in Third World
countries from one referendum per year during 1900 to 1909 to 4.3 per year from
129
1980 to 1986, "indicate[s] a steady, if slow, flood tide.'
Referendums also are popular. A survey of fourteen European nations
showed that the citizens of these countries support a Swiss model of direct
democracy. 130 A 1999 New Zealand election study found sixty-five percent
agreed that referendums were "good."' 131 "Fifty-five percent gave this response
in a 2000 Canadian poll. Only one percent of New Zealanders, and only eight
' 132
percent of Canadians, agreed that referendums were 'bad things."

IV.

TYPES OF REFERENDUMS

The referendum process varies widely from country to country and no
single typology predominates. 133 In some countries, referendums play a
continuing role, but most of the time they represent ad hoc "crisis instruments,
134
invoked to solve a particular problem or to justify a particular solution."'
Citizens may use referendums to ratify or amend constitutions. Frequently,
referendums put forward new legislation, although in some countries they may
only nullify rather than create a new law. 135 Referendums may produce positive
law, 136 or they may be only advisory, "a comprehensive opinion poll on a

127. Ireland went from one to ten referendums in this time period, while Italy went from zero to
thirty-two. See Kaufmann, supra note 81, at 3 (noting that number of referendums held between 1993
and 2003 was more than twice number in previous decade); Morel, supra note 11, at 50 (showing
doubling in twenty nations during period).
128. SETALA, supranote 10, at 1.
129. ROURKE ET AL., supra note 86, at 4.
130. Russell J. Dalton et al., Public Opinion and Direct Democracy, 12 J. DEMOCRACY, Oct.
2001, at 141, 146 (tabulating survey results showing that in most nations, over sixty-six percent of
respondents familiar with Swiss system agreed it should be considered for use in their nations).
131. NEW

ZEALAND

ELECTION

STUDY,

REPRESENTATION

AND

PARTICIPATION,

1999,

http://www.nzes.org/exec/show/freq-1999f (last visited Feb. 5, 2007).
132. Donovan, How Far, supra note 81, at 2 n.5.
133. See, e.g., MOCKLI, supra note 82, at 87-93 (distinguishing six types of referendums); SUKSL,
supra note 82, at 28-39 (identifying twelve types); ANDREAS AUER, LE RtFRENDUM ET L'INITIATIVE
POPULAIRES AUX ETATS-UNIS 7-68 (1989) (distinguishing five types of referendums and three types of
initiatives); MAGLEBY, supra note 71, at 35-36 (labeling four types: direct initiative, indirect initiative,
popular referendum, and propositions submitted by the legislature).
134. Butler & Ranney, supra note 9, at 1.
135. Id. at 1-2.
136. See Elizabeth Garret, Issues in Implementing Referendums in Israel:A ComparativeStudy in
Direct Democracy, 2 CHI. J. INT'L. L. 159, 161-62 (2001) ("Some national referendums, on the other
hand, are technically advisory only, but they effectively bind elected officials to the course of action
garnering majority support . . . . Because nationwide referendums are de facto binding on
representative institutions, formally making them binding is generally the best course of action.");
Michael Gallagher, Conclusion, in THE REFERENDUM EXPERIENCE IN EUROPE, supra note 9, at 226,
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significant issue, with a verdict that can be translated into law or policy as the
government or legislature may see fit.' ' 13 7 Referendums ordinarily must pass by a
simple majority on a single ballot, although some countries require
supermajorities or multiple elections. 38 Two features of referendums have
significance for this analysis: (1) whether the measure originates with citizens or
the government, and (2) whether the outcome binds or simply advises the
government.
A.

Origin of Referendums: Government or Citizen Sponsored

Although referendum procedures can vary along a continuum,
commentators characterize them "mainly in the degree to which they remove
control over the making of laws from elected representatives and transfer it to
provide the two
ordinary voters." 139 The poles at either end of this continuum
140
initiated.
citizen
or
initiated
government
basic categories:
Government-sponsored referendums are those drafted by a particular
branch of the government. The choices range from "the head of state or of
government, the government as a whole, a majority or a minority of MPs. a
particular number of regional, cantonal or local assemblies.' 141 In most cases, the
legislature is the responsible branch. A referendum measure generally must
receive the support of a majority of legislators to place it on the ballot. 42 In

246 ("No parliament in Europe has explicitly disregarded the verdict delivered by the people, and
were this to happen on a major issue, the fallout would be severe.").
137. Butler & Ranney, supra note 9, at 1.
138. See, e.g., John G. Matsusaka, Initiative and Referendum, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC

CHOICE (C.K. Rowley & F. Schneider eds., forthcoming) (manuscript at 3), available at http://wwwrcf.usc.edu/-matsusak/Papers/Matsusaka-IandRPCEncyclopedia.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2007)
(noting variances, in both majority level and number of times voters must approve, required for
referendum to take effect); see also Wikipedia, Referendum, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Referendum
(noting simple majority usually passes referendum, but some nations require supermajority) (last
visited Feb. 5, 2007).
139. David Butler & Austin Ranney, Theory, in REFERENDUMS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
PRACTICE AND THEORY 23, 23 (David Butler & Austin Ranney eds., 1978). To some, a "referendum"

was the label placed on measures referred by a legislative body and was divided into two types:
popular referendums and legislative referendums. The popular referendum is a process where the
people have the power to submit legislation enacted by their legislature to the people to accept or
reject. The submission process is performed by obtaining signatures on a petition. The legislative
referendum is a measure placed on the ballot by a state or local government and submitted to the
people directly for their approval or rejection. See WATERS, supra note 51, at 3, 4 (outlining initial use
of legislative referendum in America and later introduction of popular referendum).
140. Without rejecting other typologies, I am here adopting for convenience Mendelsohn and
Parkin's terminology of "citizen-sponsored initiative" and "government-sponsored referendums."
Mendelsohn & Parkin, supra note 126, at 4-5.
141. Pier Vincenzo Uleri, Introduction to THE REFERENDUM EXPERIENCE IN EUROPE, supra

note 9, at 1, 10.
142. Bogdanor, supra note 79, at 72.
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144
has had the power
some countries, however, a minority party 143 or executive
legislature.
unsupportive
an
bypass
to
a
referendum
to call for
Government-sponsored matters vary considerably in content. Some seek
citizen validation of government actions. 145 Others ask citizens to make
46
controversial decisions when the government cannot reach a consensus,
allowing legislators to avoid decisions that could generate negative political
repercussions. 147 Because political motivations often prompt governments to
seek citizen votes, some commentators have concluded that most governmentsponsored referendums offer a less valuable form of direct democracy than
citizen-initiated measures. 48 Yet, governments increasingly have felt compelled
to give their citizens a voice even when that voice may not favor the current
leadership's position. For example, although most citizen votes to ratify the
various treaties associated with European integration proceeded as government
leaders planned, 49 French and Dutch citizens derailed the EU Constitution

143. See, e.g., id. at 73 ("Article 42 prevents a Danish government, even if it enjoys a secure
majority in the Folketing, from passing legislation that is unattractive both to a minority in Parliament
and to electorate.").
144. Some have labeled popular votes conducted without fair competition as "plebiscites." Uleri,
supra note 141, at 11-12. Uleri notes:
Examples of plebiscites can be found in the French experience, from the Revolution to the
Second Empire, in the German and Italian experiences during the nazi and fascist regimes,
and in other authoritarian regimes such as Austria (1938), Greece (1926, 1968, 1973),
Portugal (1933), Spain (1947, 1966) and in past authoritarian regimes, both right-wing and
communist, of central and east European countries.
Id.
145. Morel, supra note 11, at 61. Governments use "politically obligatory legitimation"
referendums when consultation with the people is necessary to grant legitimacy to a government
decision. Id. An example of this type of referendum was a 1942 measure passed in Canada. Id. The
leader of the Liberal government made an election promise not to resort to military conscription, but
when this became untenable, the government turned to a referendum. Id. The citizen measure
released the government from responsibility for "any obligation arising out of any past commitments
restricting the methods of raising men for military service." Id.
146. "Legislative" referendums address citizen ratification of government status, but vary from
the divisions-solving referendums because they are motivated not by a controlling party's desire to
avoid a potentially damaging electoral issue, but instead by a leader who wants to promote an issue
that is not supported by the governing party and thus would not have passed through the regular
legislative process. Morel, supra note 11, at 56-57. An example is French Prime Minister Michel
Rocard's 1988 referendum on the future of New Caledonia, which sped up the Matignon peace
agreements, and which the controlling party might have opposed. Id. at 57-58.
147. "Divisions-solving" referendums have been particularly frequent and account for much of
the general increase in the use of government-sponsored referendums since the 1970s. Id at 53.
Examples of this type of referendum include questions about membership in the European Union or
NATO. Id. A governing party can use "divisions-solving" referendums to address competing factions
within its ranks or "as a palliative to avoid the electoral repercussions of a divisive issue." Id. at 54; see
also, e.g., id. at 55-56 (noting Sweden held referendum on EU membership in 1994 to prevent its use as
a campaign issue in pending elections).
148. Morel, supra note 11, at 48 (arguing that degree of government control in governmentsponsored referendums means these "could be less democratic" than those sponsored by citizens).
149. Donovan, How Far, supra note 81, at 1 n.3 (citing Anders Todal Jenssen & Ola Listhaug,
Voters' Decisions in the Nordic EU Referendums of 1994: The Importance of Party Cues, in
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when they rejected their leaders' positions and voted against ratification in
150
recent referendums.
In contrast to government-sponsored referendums, citizen-initiated
referendums, also called "citizen initiatives," 151 originate from the people
'
themselves. Citizens have used referendums to "legitimize strong leadership"152
'
153
or to overcome legislative "paralysis.'
In other instances, citizens have used
initiatives as a mechanism to check the power of the central government. Italy,
for instance, introduced referendums as a check on the role of the Italian
Parliament and as a reaction "against the Fascist conception of strong
54
leadership.'

The most significant distinction for this discussion is between referendums
that allow citizens a voice within a unitary legislative process and referendums
that create law outside that process. In the unitary process schemes, citizeninitiated measures prod or encourage legislatures to enact laws. Thus, citizen
signatures on a referendum petition, or actual citizen votes on the referendum
itself, serve primarily to set the legislative agenda on an issue. 155 In direct
contrast stand schemes that serve as an alternative to the unitary process,
allowing citizens to bypass a legislature completely and create binding law.
Under these schemes, a measure that receives a majority vote from citizens may

become law even if a majority of legislators opposes it. 156 These types of citizenREFERENDUM DEMOCRACY, supra note 11, at 169, 189). Danish citizens first voted "no" on the
Maastricht Treaty in 1992, but in 1993 voted to ratify after implementing opt outs such as use of the
Euro. The European Union Constitution: The Maastricht Treaty Ratification, http://www.unizar.es/
euroconstitucion/Treaties/Treaty MaastRat.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2007).
150. See Richard Bernstein, 2 'No' Votes in Europe: The Anger Spreads, N.Y. TIMES, June 2,
2005, at Al (attributing EU constitution's failure in France and Netherlands to mistrust of government
assurances that free market measures will ultimately create economic benefits).
151. Michaell Crews-Yancey, Note, Should Disparate Impact Claims Be Allowed Against
Municipal Corporationsin Its Use of Initiativeand Referendum Poweras to Low or Moderate-Income
Housing Projects?4 J.L. Soc'Y 415, 416 (2003) ("Initiatives allow citizens to initiate legislation. On the
other hand, referendums allow citizens to vote in favor of or against current legislation.").
152. Bogdanor, supra note 79, at 61 ("[T]he French Fifth Republic Constitution found a place for
the referendum to legitimize strong leadership ... ").
153. Id. at 61-62 (citing Giulio Andreotti, Intervention, in DEUX CONSTIuTTIONS: LA VE
RItPUBLIQUE ET LA RItPUBLIQUE ITALIENNE: PARALLItLES ET COMMENTAIRES

71, 71-73 (G.

Andreotti et al. eds., 1988) ("[T]he French Constitution of 1958 was established in reaction to a
parliamentary regime thought to have caused paralysis and immobilisme...."); see also WATERS,
supra note 51, at 3 (stating that referendums can force action when legislatures are deadlocked and
became "paralyzed by inaction").
154. Bogdanor, supra note 79, at 61 (citing Andreotti, supra note 153, at 71). Referendums were
added to the Italian Constitution in 1947. Id. at 61-62.
155. See, e.g., MASS. CONST. amend. 48 ("Legislative power shall continue to be vested in the
general court; but the people reserve to themselves the popular initiative, which is the power of a
specified number of voters to submit constitutional amendments and laws to the people for approval
or rejection; and the popular referendum, which is the power of a specified number of voters to submit
laws, enacted by the general court, to the people for their ratification or rejection.").
156. Laws that are popularly enacted may be hard for representative bodies to change. Many
initiatives amend state constitutions, so modifying or repealing them requires another popular vote.
Constitutional amendments are immune from state constitutional challenges. David B. Magleby,
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created referendums can represent powerful mechanisms for reducing the
authority of elected representatives.
Citizen-initiated referendums, however, do have their limitations. Although
some advocates believe that citizen-initiated measures represent a purer form of
direct democracy and better serve as barometers of the public will, 157 some
initiative processes have considerable restrictions. Countries that rely on citizen
initiatives frequently limit the subjects that citizens may put to a vote and employ
various procedural restraints that sometimes make the use of initiatives difficult
and costly.1 58 In addition, citizen-sponsored referendums can, and often do,
create a high degree of inflexibility. Once passed, a change might prove difficult,
159
especially when the initiative amends a constitution.
Finally, perhaps the most serious complaint directed at referendums
enacted outside of the unitary legislative process is that they sidestep the giveand-take that usually attends the adoption of major legislation. 160 "When groups
or individuals can bypass deliberative bodies and enact these passions by
161
plebiscite, the state departs from republican lawmaking."'
B.

Effect of Referendums: Binding v. Advisory

Referendum outcomes vary. Some bind or make their terms obligatory.
Others simply advise and allow legislators and executives to retain some
discretion over implementation.

Direct Legislation in the American States, in REFERENDUMS AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 9, at

218, 229.
157. See, e.g., Harold Hubschman & Holly Robichaud, Op-Ed., Ballot Initiatives Guarantee
Political Clout for the Masses, BOSTON HERALD, Apr. 7, 2001, at 12 (arguing referendums serve a
"vital role in our system of crafting laws").
158. For example, Italy's referendum abrogativo creates a "popular veto or abrogative
referendum on all laws, except for those dealing with financial legislation, pardons, and treaty
ratification." Bogdanor, supra note 79, at 62.
159. See David B. Magleby, Let the Voters Decide? An Assessment of the Initiative and
Referendum Process, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 13, 18 (1995) (noting that half the states restrict in some
way ability of legislatures to amend statutory initiatives and that no provision exists for executive veto
of direct legislation). Under California law, successful statutory initiatives cannot be amended by the
legislature unless the initiative itself allows such change. Many initiatives provide for amendment by
the legislature, however, so long as the amendment furthers the purpose of the initiative. See CAL.
CONST. art. I1,§ 10(c) (stating legislature can change initiative when the initiative expressly permits
legislative amendment or repeal without voter approval).
160. See Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1520-21, 1527,
1555 (1990) (contrasting process of debate in legislatures with limited choices in plebiscites); Elizabeth
Garrett, Who Directs Direct Democracy?, 4 U. CHI. L. ScH. ROUNDTABLE 17, 20 (1997) (noting that
substantive public discussion does not occur with most referendums).
161. Hans A. Linde, On Reconstituting "Republican Government," 19 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV.
193, 206 (1994).
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Binding referendums compel governments to implement them. 62 What the
referendum compels the government to do, however, depends on the process
established. The direct referendum provides the most common binding process
and becomes positive law once passed. 163 Switzerland, Australia, and
approximately half of the states in the United States offer this direct referendum
process.164 The opportunity for citizens to flex their muscles in this way
encourages use: Switzerland and Australia account for the most frequent
referendums on a national level. 165 Likewise, Oregon, California, Colorado,
North Dakota, and Arizona historically represent states with the highest
166
initiative use, and all offer direct initiative processes.
Italy has used a unique version of the direct initiative. Article 75 of Italy's
Constitution contains the referendum abrogativo, which allows citizens to nullify
legislation enacted at the national level. 167 This veto can apply to all or portions
of legislation. Because the process allows citizens to negate actions by the
legislature and because the threat of a referendum veto has often motivated the
parliament to act, commentators have argued that it "has done much to serve the
long-term interests of the Italian people" and has transformed Italy from a
"partyocracy to democracy."' 68 The effectiveness of this process has made Italy
the European country with the second highest use of referendums, surpassed
169
only by Switzerland.
162. See, e.g., Bruno Kaufmann & Theo Schiller, Initiative for Europe: Into New Democratic
Territory 10 (October 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Temple Law Review) (defining
"binding" as a "[d]escription of a vote of the electorate where, if a proposal passes, the government or
appropriate authority is compelled to implement it").
163. These referendums are called "direct" because they become law upon a majority vote of
citizens even though there is some variation about how to calculate that majority vote. Some
governments require a majority of registered voters (simple majority), some require only a majority of
those voters who voted on the measure (plurality), and some require a supermajority.
164. See Bundesverfassung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft [BV], Constitution frdrrale
de la Confrdrration suisse [Cst] [Constitution] April 18, 1999, art. 136, 1 2 (Switz.) (guaranteeing right
to "launch and sign popular initiatives and referenda in federal matters"); id. art. 138, 139 (allowing
100,000 voters to launch complete or partial constitutional amendment); id. art. 140 (requiring all
proposed constitutional amendments from whatever source, all joining of international organizations
for security or extranational communities, and all legislation launched by initiative to be put to
popular vote); id. art. 141 (requiring any legislation and certain treaties to be put to vote on request of
50,000 voters and allowing parliament to put any treaties to popular vote); id. art. 142 (requiring

simple majority for passage of items put to vote); CONST. § 128 (Austl.) (providing that, once
approved by majority of voters and majority of states, a constitutional amendment "shall be presented
to the Governor-General for the Queen's assent"); see also Persily, supra note 72, at 15-16 tbl.1
(tabulating the twenty-five U.S. states with referendum and twenty-three with some form of initiative).
165. See Kobach, supra note 83, at 1 (noting that Switzerland accounts for more than two-thirds
of all nationwide referendums held in democracies since World War II); Donovan, How Far, supra
note 81, at 2 n.4 ("Australians have voted on dozens of national matters, and most recently rejected a
constitutional proposal to switch from a monarchy to a republic in 1999.").
166. WATERS, supra note 51, at 8. For more information on the number of measures proposed in
each state, see Price, supranote 73, at 4-5.
167. COST.art. 75 (Italy).
168. Bogdanor, supra note 79, at 69.
169. The Italian people have used the veto approach twenty-six times since 1947. Id. at 62.
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In contrast to votes that bind in legal terms, some referendums are only
advisory or "consultative."' 170 Advisory referendums are not as common in the
United States, and "some state constitutions disallow ballot questions that have
no legal effect."'1 71 Yet New Zealand 172 and several European countries,
including Denmark, Finland, Italy, Norway, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom, 173 have used referendums that do not formally bind. Critics of the New
Zealand advisory referendum process, however, call it "a fraud on the
community" because the government asks the public "for its opinion when the
174
Government has said that it will not necessarily follow that opinion."'
Consequently, New Zealand's advisory referendum statute, although'176popular at
first, 175 "[w]ithin a decade ... appears to have fallen into desuetude.'
This conclusion presumes, however, that the primary objective of citizeninitiated referendums is for them to create positive law. The reality, in fact, is
that "most initiatives fail,"' 177 and despite low passage rates and despite high
costs, the main reason interest groups in the United States continue to pursue
unsuccessful initiatives is that they can be an effective route "to exert pressure
on other political actors."1 78 Thus, these advisory referendums allow citizens "to
179
place pressure on legislative bodies to take a certain course of action."
In the United States, citizens have used advisory referendums in the local
government arena. For example, in 1983, local voters passed Proposition 0 that
asked the City of San Francisco to notify President Reagan that they favored the
repeal of bilingual ballot provisions of the Federal Voting Rights Act. 180 In
170. See Kaufmann & Schiller, supra note 162, at 10 (defining "consultative referendum" as "[a]
vote of the electorate the outcome of which is in legal terms only advisory upon a government or
appropriate authority").
171. Garrett, supra note 11, at 161.
172. See Citizens Initiated Referenda Act 1993, 1993 S.N.Z. No. 101 ("[The results of .. .
[citizen-initiated] referenda will indicate the views held by the people of New Zealand on specific
questions but will not be binding on the New Zealand Government."); Caroline Morris, Improving
Our Democracy or a Fraud on the Community? A Closer Look at New Zealand's Citizens Initiated
Referenda Act 1993, 25 STATUTE L. REV. 116, 117 (2004) (stating purpose of act was to allow citizens
to notify government of public will on specific issues).
173. Michael Gallagher, Conclusion, in THE REFERENDUM EXPERIENCE INEUROPE, supra note
9, at 226, 246.
174. 522 N.Z. PARL. DEB., H.R. 670 (1992), available at http://www.vdig.netlhansard/
archive.jsp?y=1992&m--03&d=10&o=38&p=47 (statement of David Lange, M.P.).
175. In 1994, one year after the Citizens Initiated Referenda Act became law, citizens submitted
eighteen questions to voters. Morris, supra note 172, at 117.
176. See id. (stating that in 2001 and 2003 only two referendums per year were submitted to
voters under the Citizens Initiated Referenda Act and none were submitted in 2002).
177. Elisabeth R. Gerber, PressuringLegislatures Through the Use of Initiatives: Two Forms of
IndirectInfluence, in CITIZENS As LEGISLATORS 191, 191 (Shaun Bowler et al. eds., 1998).
178. Id.
179. See JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY: POPULISM REVISED 78 (1986)
(explaining that "a large favorable vote on the question exerts great pressure on the legislative body to
accede to the desire of the electorate").
180. Id. at 73; see also JAMIE B. DRAPER & MARTHA JIMtNEZ, OFFICIAL ENGLISH? No! A
CHRONOLOGY
OF
THE
OFFICIAL
ENGLISH
MOVEMENT
2
(2000),
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addition, during the late 1970s, advisory referendums directed attention to
national environmental and nuclear-freeze issues.18 1 More significantly, the
experience in Europe has shown that advisory referendums often effectively
bind governments. "No parliament in Europe has explicitly disregarded the
verdict delivered by the people, and were this to happen on a major issue, the
1' 82
fallout would be severe.
Furthermore, an advisory referendum often proves preferable to one that
binds. First, it does not conflict with an existing system of government that
requires legislative supremacy. For example, in the United Kingdom, the "notion
of parliamentary sovereignty" 183 dictates that Parliament cannot be formally
bound by an advisory referendum. 184 Consequently, an advisory referendum
exerts pressure while simultaneously preserving the existing governance
system. 185 Second, an advisory process better reflects the reality that government
actors must interpret and implement any measure.1 86 An advisory referendum
allows a legislature flexibility to predict the outcome of a provision in a manner
that reconciles possible conflicts 187 and anticipates constitutional challenges in
188
the courts.

http://www.usc.edu/dept/education/CMMR/PolicyPDF/OfficialEnglishDraperJimenez.pdf
(noting
Proposition 0 passed with sixty-three percent of vote).
181. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 179, at 78.
182. Gallagher, supra note 173, at 246.
183. Garrett, supra note 11, at 162.
184. Rather, referendums in the United Kingdom can be used to add legitimacy when
controversial legislation is introduced. See CONSTITUTION UNIT & ELECTORAL REFORM SOC'Y,
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE CONDUCT OF REFERENDUMS 6 (1996) (noting importance of

establishing acceptable guidelines to ensure consistent administration and to "maximize confidence in
the legitimacy of [the] results"); VERNON BOGDANOR, The Referendum in the United Kingdom, in
POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION: ESSAYS ON BRITISH GOVERNMENT 213, 239-40 (1996) (noting that

advisory referendums leave legislature's sovereignty formally intact); David Butler & lain Mclean,
Referendums, in SCOTLAND AND WALES: NATIONS AGAIN? 1, 10-12 (Bridget Taylor & Katarina
Thomson eds., 1999) (noting that although all eight UK referendums were advisory, each was accepted
by government as guide to future action).
185. Joseph Jaconelli, Majority Rule and Special Majorities, 1989 PUB. L. 587, 592. Jaconelli
observes:
According to the orthodox constitutional viewpoint, a British referendum can never be more
than advisory in nature. No Parliament could effectively legislate to transfer the final
decision on a matter from itself into the hands of the electorate voting by referendum. Be
that as it may, an advisory referendum may well be inconclusive as to the guidance it gives to
Parliament.
Id.
186. See, e.g., ELISABETH R. GERBER ET AL., STEALING THE INITIATIVE: How STATE
GOVERNMENT RESPONDS TO DIRECT DEMOCRACY, at vii (2001) (noting legislatures influence actual

consequences of winning initiative measures through interpretation of the initiative and policy
decisions regarding implementation).
187. Garrett, supra note 11, at 162; see, e.g., Kathleen J. Gebhardt, Challenges to Funding School
Facilitiesin Colorado, 83 NEB. L. REV. 856, 861 (2005) (describing conflict between Taxpayer's Bill of
Rights and school districts' abilities to levy special taxes with direct voter approval); see also Michael
R. Johnson et al., State Constitutional Tax Limitations: The Colorado and California Experiences, 35
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REFERENDUMS AND THE EU CONSTITUTION

Direct citizen votes are now so widely recognized in Europe that delegates
included referendums as part of the proposed EU Constitution. The "European
Citizens' Initiative" 189 in article 1-47(4) establishes a process for citizensponsored referendums addressing EU-wide legislation. The provision only
allows citizens to "invite" the European Commission to consider legislation and,
therefore, creates only an advisory referendum process. Nevertheless, the
approach represents a dramatic step toward "referendum democracy."1 90 The
proposal has remarkable breadth because it allows EU citizens in the current
twenty-five member countries to participate directly in "European agendasetting." 191Moreover, because the European Parliament also has the power only
to "invite" the European Commission to consider legislation, article 1-47(4)
192
affords citizens power equal to that of the Parliament in the legislative process.
A.

Short History of the EU and the Proposed EU Constitution

The seeds of the European Union arose out of the economic dislocation
after World War 11.193 In the 1950s, heads of European states entered into
treaties-such as the European Coal and Steel Community, 94 the European
Atomic Energy Community, 195 and the European Economic Community' 96-to

URB. LAW. 817, 821 (2003) (describing limitations Taxpayer's Bill of Rights places on school districts'
abilities to raise additional revenue through voter-approved measures).
188. Cf., e.g., Taxpayers to Limit Campaign Spending v. Fair Political Practices Comm'n, 799
P.2d 1220, 1236-37 (Cal. 1990) (concluding state constitution prohibits legislature from engrafting
portions of one ballot measure onto another ballot measure).
189. Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe art. 1-47(4), Oct. 29, 2004, 2004 O.J. (C 310) 1,
availableat http://europa.eu.int/constitution/download/print.en.pdf [hereinafter EU Treaty].
190. Mendelsohn & Parkin, supra note 126, at 1-4. "Referendum democracy" is the phrase coined
by Mendelsohn and Parkin to encompass all forms of citizen vote because they see any referendum
measure "as being intricately intertwined with the institutions and agents of representative
democracy." Id. at 4.
191. Kaufmann & Schiller, supranote 162, at 4.
192. Id.
193. P.S.R.F. MATHIJSEN, A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN UNION LAW 12 (2004) ("[O]n September 19,
1946, in a speech at Zurich University... Winston Churchill proposed a 'sovereign remedy', i.e. to
'recreate the European family, or as much of it as we can, and provide itwith a structure under which
itcan dwell in peace, in safety and in freedom ....[A] kind of United States of Europe."). On May 5,
1949, the Treaty establishing the Council of Europe was signed. Id. at n.2.
194. Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S.
140.
195. Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S.
169. This treaty is often referred to as the Euratom Treaty. Id.
196. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11
[hereinafter EEC Treaty]. Although sometimes referred to as the "Treaty of Rome," doing so can
cause confusion as many use that term to embrace both the Euratom and EEC Treaties. Compare, e.g.,
Barbara Crutchfield George, The 1998 OECD Convention: An Impetus For Worldwide Changes in
Attitudes Toward Corruption in Business Transactions, 37 AM. Bus. L.J. 485, 499 n.92 (referring to
EEC Treaty as "Treaty of Rome"), with, e.g., Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy
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"render a third European war impossible."' 97 Economics provided the initial
mechanism to achieve unity; European countries hoped to avoid war because of
"the direct economic benefits of a common market."' 198 "Democracy was, by way
of contrast, a secondary consideration .... Legitimacy was conceived of once
99
again largely in terms of outcomes, more specifically increased prosperity.'
Gradually, the process of economic integration triggered a need for political
reform. In the late 1970s, the member states 20° introduced democratic and social
issues into the agreements when they provided for the election of representatives
to a European Parliament 201 and issued a Joint Declaration of Fundamental
Rights. 2°2 The "Single European Act," signed in February 1986, continued to
focus primarily on economic issues and created a single market that ensured the
"free movement of goods, persons, services and capital" between countries in the
European Community. 20 3 At the same time, however, the Single European Act
promoted a more democratic process that allowed the European Parliament a
204
more meaningful involvement in the legislative process.
The Maastricht Treaty, 205 signed in February of 1992, again continued the
focus on economic and monetary policy and established the Euro as a common
currency for use among the member states. The Maastricht Treaty, however,
went beyond previous efforts at political integration when it acknowledged the
need for "a common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing
of a common defence policy, the introduction of a citizenship of the Union, [and]
20 6
co-operation on justice and home affairs."

Community (Euratom), March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 167, http://europa.eu/scadplus/treaties/
euratomen.htm (referring to EEC and Euratom Treaty collectively as "Treaties of Rome").
197. Paul Craig, The Nature of the Community: Integration, Democracy, and Legitimacy, in THE
EVOLUTION OF EU LAW 1, 6 (Paul Craig & Griinne de Bdrca eds., 1999).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 7 (citing LEON N. LINDBERG & STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, EUROPE'S WOULD-BE
POLITY: PATrERNS OF CHANGE IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 260-63 (1970)).
200. In 1976, the member states consisted of Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Germany, The
Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom. See The European Integration: EU
Membership, http://www.xanthi.ilsp.gr/kemeseu/chl/eu-membership.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2007)
(illustrating history of EEC, EC, and EU membership).
201. Council Decision 76/787, 1976 O.J. (L 278) 1, 5 (EC); see also MATHIJSEN, supra note 193, at
16 (detailing direct election of European Parliament as one step in history of European Community).
202. Joint Declaration by the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, 1977 O.J.
(C 103) 1 (EC); see also MATHUSEN, supra note 193, at 16 (describing member states' leaders'
intentions to safeguard citizens' fundamental fights).
203. MATHUISEN, supra note 193, at 4, 17-18; see also Single European Act, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1
(agreeing to render member nations a single economic market by December 31, 1992).
204. MATHUSEN, supra note 193, at 18.
205. 1993 O.J. (C 293) 61 (EC) (consolidated version as modified by the Amsterdam and Nice
Treaties, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 1). This treaty is called the Maastricht Treaty because it was signed in
Maastricht, The Netherlands on February 7, 1992, and it is also called the Treaty on European Union.
This EU Treaty entered into force on November 1, 1993, after being ratified by the parliaments of the
twelve member states at the time, often after being approved through citizen referendum.
206. MATHUSEN, supra note 193, at 18. Some of the community fields of action addressed were
education, culture, public health, and consumer protection. Id. at 19.
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Subsequent treaties increasingly dealt with political issues. As the members
of the EU met to negotiate the Nice Treaty of 2001,207 participants realized that a
more comprehensive and systematic approach was required. The heads of state
of the then fifteen member states met in Laeken, a northern Brussels suburb in
Belgium, on December 15, 2001, and adopted the "Declaration on the Future of
the European Union." 208 Subsequently, a convention of 105 delegates first met
on February 28, 2002, and continued their work over the next fifteen months.
Plenary sessions and working groups met each month to focus on a series of
topics. 20 9 At the end of the convention, the delegates agreed to move forward to
create an EU Constitution. They presented a draft to the European Council at
Thessaloniki, Greece, on June 20, 2003. Although the heads of government
signed the proposed EU Constitution as a treaty in October of 2004,210 they
agreed that the EU would not exist as a separate entity until all twenty-five 211
member states ratified the draft. 212

207. Treaty of Nice Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the
European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Oct. 3, 2001, 2001 O.J. (C 80) 1 [hereinafter Treaty
of Nice].
208. See Presidency Conclusions, Laeken European Council annex I at 19-26 (Dec. 14-15, 2001),
available
at
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms-Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/68827.pdf
[hereinafter Laeken Declaration] (holding a "convention on the future of Europe" to consider
approaching challenges and possible responses).
209. Debates and other contributions from the convention participants are posted on the Internet
at http://european-convention.eu.int (last visited Feb. 10, 2007).
210. EU Leaders Sign New Constitution, BBC NEWS, Oct. 29, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
1/hi/world/europe/3963701.stm.
211. Although the European Union now has twenty-seven member states, at the time the heads
of government signed this proposed EU Constitution, there were only twenty-five members. Bulgaria
and Romania joined the EU on January 1, 2007. Romania and Bulgariajoin the EU, BBC NEWS, Jan.
1, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6220591.stm. The current EU Members States include:
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. Applicant countries
include Croatia, Macedonia, and Turkey. Europa, Member States of the EU, http://www.europa.eu/
abc/governments/index-en.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2007).
212. EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, A CONSTITUTION FOR EUROPE: CONSTITUTION ADOPTED BY
THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT: PRESENTATION TO CITIZENS 6 (2004), available at
http://europa.eu/constitution/download/presentation-citizens_010704-en.pdf
[hereinafter
EUROPA
PAMPHLET]. But some commentators have noted that there are alternative scenarios if a member state

votes "no," depending on which member state it is. See DANIEL KEOHANE, CTR. FOR EUROPEAN
REFORM, A GUIDE TO THE REFERENDA ON THE EU CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY 4-5 (2004), available
at www.cer.org.uk/pdf/briefing-referenda.pdf (theorizing that beyond abandoning or redrafting in
response to single negative vote, the declining member could hold another referendum or agree that
the members can proceed to adopt).
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EU Governance

The EU system of governance is complex and without parallel in any other
nation or conglomeration of nations in the world.2 13 The European Council
represents the most prominent of the EU institutions. The European Council
consists of the heads of government of the member states who provide political
"impetus" for the EU. 21 4 EU citizens do not vote either directly or indirectly for
the President of the European Council. 215 Instead, the European Council
presidency rotates among the member countries. 216 The President has little
substantive authority but acts as a figurehead to "push forward the work of the
[EU]. '' 217 In contrast, true authority for EU legislation rests in three institutions:
(1) the European Parliament, (2) the Council of Ministers, and (3) the European
218
Commission.
213. That complexity, however, is not without critique. See Stephen C. Sieberson, The Proposed
European Union Constitution - Will It Eliminate The EU's Democratic Deficit?, 10 COLUM. J. EUR. L.
173, 189 (2004) ("Institutional complexity is the chief complaint about the European Union.").
214. EU Treaty, supranote 189, art. 1-21.
215. Id. (providing for election of Council President by qualified majority of Council). By way of
contrast, in the United States, citizens have a direct vote for their legislators, but an indirect vote
through the Electoral College for the presidency. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (providing for
popular election of members of House of Representatives directly by voters), and U.S. CONST. art. I, §
3, cl. 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, § 1 (providing for popular election of members of
Senate directly by voters), with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 2 (providing for indirect election of
President by a college of electors who are, in turn, chosen by voters on a state-by-state basis).
216. See EU Treaty, supra note 189, art. 1-22 (providing that President of European Council can
serve maximum of two terms and shall not hold national office).
217. EUROPA PAMPHLET, supra note 212, at 16. Under the EU Constitution, the President will
chair the European Council's meetings and serve as a representative of the Union in matters of foreign
and security policy. EU Treaty, supra note 189, art. 1-22.
218. EUROPA PAMPHLET, supra note 212, at 15-17. In addition, the EU includes a judicial
function handled by the Court of Justice. The Court of Justice plays the primary role of enforcing the
law comparable to that of the United States judiciary. Nevertheless, as Justice Stephen G. Breyer has
noted:
There is further uncertainty about how the European Court of Justice will work now that it
has been expanded from 15 to 25 judges ... [using] 20 official languages ....
[T]he U.S.
Supreme court has only nine judges and one language, and it is hard enough for us to find
agreement.
Stephen G. Breyer, The Enlarged European Union, Europe's Constitution Is Welcome, but Very
Different from its U.S. Counterpart, EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, Spring 2004, available at http://
www.europeanaffairs.org/archive/2004_spring/2004-spring_50.php4. Instead of being elected by the
people, the judges on the EU Court of Justice are appointed through common accord by the
governments of the member states. EU Treaty, supra note 189, art. 111-355. Another judicial body in
the EU, which was upgraded to the status of an institution in 1977, is the Court of Auditors. Michael J.
McCormick, A Primeron the European Union and its Legal System, ARMY LAW., Dec. 2002, at 1, 7.
The Court of Auditors is composed of one national from each member state, and its role is to "assist
the European Parliament and the Council in exercising their powers of control over the
implementation of the budget." Treaty of Nice, supra note 207, art. 2(37). Although the Court of
Auditors has the power to go to court, it does not legislate or otherwise issue binding acts. MATHIJSEN,
supra note 193, at 144-45. Therefore, it is not addressed in the summary for this section. Aside from
these main institutions, the EU Constitution sets out other bodies such as the European Investment
Bank and special committees. "What distinguishes an institution from other Community bodies is the
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The European Parliament

The European Parliament is the only democratically elected body in the
EU. Members receive five-year terms, and citizens throughout the EU elect
them directly. 219 At the time of the 2004 election, the 535 seats were allocated in
220
rough proportion to the population of the member states.
The European Parliament originally had only an "advisory and supervisory"
role with respect to legislation. 22 1 Legislative authority has, however, gradually
increased. The European Parliament had some control over the budget early on,
and more recent treaties have given it a measure of "co-decision power" along
with the other EU institutions. 222 Although only the European Commission has
the authority to initiate legislation, 223 a majority in the European Parliament may
"request the Commission to submit any appropriate proposal. '224
2.

The Council of Ministers

The Council of Ministers is a separate body from the European Council.
While the European Council is composed of the heads of member states, the
Council of Ministers is a body of individuals appointed by the government of
each member state. 225 Also, while the European Council only meets quarterly,
the delegates in the Council of Ministers make EU decisions in a more
226
continuous way on behalf of their governments.
The Council of Ministers is a "supranational institution," or one that can
override the powers of individual nations. 227 As an institution of the EU
Community and a collection of representatives from the member states, the
fact that the former, generally speaking, can 'act', i.e. take generally binding decisions .... The other
organs, on the other hand, operate in specific fields and either have a purely advisory task or take
decisions which are not generally binding." Id. at 51.
219. EUROPA PAMPHLET, supra note 212, at 15.
220. MATHIJSEN, supra note 193, at 54. The Nice Treaty, which is still in effect, limits the
membership to not more than 732. Treaty of Nice, supra note 207, Protocol A, art. 2. The proposed
European Constitution would cap membership in the European Parliament at 750, and under
"degressive proportionality," each member state may have a minimum of six and a maximum of
ninety-six seats. EUROPA PAMPHLET, supra note 212, at 15.
221. From the origin of the EU, however, there has been some resistance to calling this elected
body a "parliament" because it does not exercise the power to legislate or raise taxes generally
recognized as the authority of a parliament. MATHIJSEN, supranote 193, at 53, 55-56.
222. Id. at 55-56.
223. Id at 100.
224. EU Treaty, supra note 189, art. 111-332.
225. Id. arts. 1-21(2), 1-23(2).
226. See The Council of the European Union, The Council, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/
showPage.asp?lang=en&id=426&mode=g&name= (last visited Feb. 1, 2007) (noting that Council
meets several times per month).
227. Gary Marks et al., European Integration from the 1980s: State-Centric v. Multi-Level
Governance, 34 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 341, 372 (1996). Even though some EU officials may have
powers as officials in their own countries, they are given new powers within the EU and "have
independent influence in policy-making that cannot be derived from their role as agents of state
executives." Id. at 346.
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Council serves two roles: (1) as part of the supranational government, and (2) as
a collection of intergovernmental negotiators. 228 The "dichotomy... between
the general interest of the Community and the national interests of the
individual Member States" often creates friction for the Council. 229
As one of the EU's "co-law-maker[sI," the Council of Ministers shares
legislative powers with the European Parliament. 230 As with the Parliament, the
Council does not have the right to initiate legislation, but rather, it only has the
2 31
right to submit a request for legislation to the European Commission
3.

The European Commission

The European Commission is a quasi-executive body appointed by the
governments of each of the member states. 232 In contrast to the members of the
Council of Ministers, who represent each Member State, the members of the
European Commission represent the EU as a whole. Officials in the member
states appoint the members of the European Commission, yet they do not
represent any single country. Instead, they have a guaranteed five-year term and
are charged to act independently without instruction from their home
233

governments.
234
The Commission has been called "the pinnacle of Brussels bureaucracy,"
and its tasks include ensuring the application of EU law, negotiating
international agreements, implementing the EU budget, and publishing an
annual report of EU activities. 2 35 In addition, the Commission participates in the
legislative process. Under the EU Constitution, "[t]he European Commission
holds the monopoly in presenting new EU laws." 23 6 The Council of Ministers
and the European Parliament "can, in most cases, only legislate on the basis of a
proposal submitted by the Commission."'2 37 Thus, "the Commission enjoys the

228. MATHUSEN, supra note 193, at 73.

229. d at 73-74.
230. Id at 83.
231. EEC Treaty, supra note 196, art. 152 ("The Council may request the Commission to
undertake any studies which the Council considers desirable for the achievement of the common
objectives, and to submit to it any appropriate proposals.").
232. Before November 1, 2004, the Commission consisted of two nationals from each of the most
populated member states and one national from every other state in the Union. EUROPA PAMPHLET,
supra note 212, at 17-18. Afterward, the Commission changed to include one commissioner from each
member state. Id. at 18. By 2014, the commissioners will rotate equally among nationals from the.
member states, and the Commission will be reduced in size and consist of two-thirds of the number of
member states. Id.; see also A Constitution for Europe, The Institutions of the Union: The European
Commission, http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/constitution/commission-en.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2007)
(detailing the current composition of the Commission). Although there is agreement that twenty
members are too many, having fewer would mean that some countries might not have a direct say in
appointing a representative. MATHUSEN, supra note 193, at 90.
233. EU Treaty, supra note 189, art. 1-26.
234. Sieberson, supra note 213, at 219.
235. MATHIJSEN, supranote 193, at 92.

236. Kirk, supra note 81.
237. MATHIJSEN, supranote 193, at 100.
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exclusive right [to] initiat[e]" legislation and "neither Council nor Parliament can
take legislative initiatives."' 238 While the Commission may often find it difficult to
ignore a "request" for legislation from the Council or Parliament, 239 the
Commission, and not these other bodies, remains "politically responsible," and
"submission by the Commission of a proposal for legislation constitutes the start
of the decision-making process in which the three institutions, Commission,
Parliament, and Council, each play an essential role." 240 Thus, the Commission,
an appointed body not elected by the citizens of Europe, 24' acts as the
gatekeeper of EU legislation.
C.

DirectDemocracy in the EU

The EU arose out of treaties negotiated among governmental officials, and
EU citizens have had only a "lukewarm" response to the EU's "role in their

lives." 242 For the people of Europe, "the EU represents yet another layer of
government ' 243 imposed by "faceless and unaccountable [actors]" operating
"behind closed doors." 244 Because of this lack of accountability, commentators
have continued to decry the EU for its "democratic deficit.

' 245

238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Vernon Bogdanor has proposed direct elections of Commissioners. See Vernon Bogdanor,
The Future of the European Community: Two Models of Democracy, 21 GOV'T & OPPOSITION 161,
174-76 (1986) (suggesting direct election would enhance salience of the EU). Michael Newman,
however, has rejected this as a "radical proposal." Sieberson, supra note 213, at 221 (noting concerns
of Newman and others that directly elected Commissioners could claim democratic legitimacy equal to
or greater than the existing bodies, further complicating an already convoluted legislative system).
242. Sieberson, supra note 213, at 188-89 (citing Eurobarometer public survey recording only
fifty percent of EU citizens feeling their countries benefited from being members of the European
Union).
243. Id.at 194; see also Giandomenico Majone, Europe's 'Democratic Deficit': The Question of
Standards, 4 EUR. L.J. 5, 15 (1998) ("Democratic deficit.., refers to the legitimacy problems of
nonmajoritarian institutions, i.e., institutions which by design are not directly accountable to the voters
or to their elected representatives.").
244. G.F. MANCINI, Democracy and the European Court of Justice, in DEMOCRACY AND
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: COLLECTED ESSAYS 31, 31-33, 49 (2000); see also
Reginald Dale, Thinking Ahead: Commission's Crisis is a Good Sign, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 19,

1999, at 11 (describing strong criticism EU faces for being in control of unaccountable "faceless"
bureaucrats).
245. The term "democratic deficit" is attributed to David Marquand. See DAVID MARQUAND,
PARLIAMENT FOR EUROPE 64-66 (1979) (describing democratic deficit as resulting from lack of
governmental accountability). Although the concept of democratic deficit covers a wide range of
issues from executive dominance to lack of transparency, this discussion will focus on the deficit in
relation to citizen participation. See Craig, supra note 197, at 23-24 (discussing democratic deficiency
issues, including distance, "executive dominance," "by-passing of democracy," complexity,
transparency, "substantive imbalance," and "weakening of judicial control"). See generally A
CITIZENS' EUROPE: IN SEARCH OF A NEW ORDER (Allan Rosas & Esko Antola eds., 1995) (exploring

definitions of EU citizenship with particular attention to obstacles between citizens and detached EU
political institutions); CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 43-106
(Francis Snyder ed., 1996) (containing submissions relating to constitutional law of European Union as
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discussed at international conference, including discussion of subsidiarity and legitimacy issues);
CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY AND SOVEREIGNTY: AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES

77-129 (Richard Bellamy ed., 1996) (examining proposals to remedy situation caused by EU where
EU law is divorced from people it governs and examining legitimacy concerns present in current EU
system); RICHARD CORBETT ET AL., THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (3d ed. 1995) (reviewing structure,
power, and role of European Parliament); THE CRISIS OF REPRESENTATION IN EUROPE (Jack

Hayward ed., 1995) (indicating disaffection in EU resulting from transfer of legitimate power away
from the people, problems with European party system, significance of national parliaments, and
Europe's lack of enthusiasm for integration); DEIRDRE M. CURTIN, POSTNATIONAL DEMOCRACY:
THE EUROPEAN UNION IN SEARCH OF A POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 41-51 (1997) (describing the lack of

"political arena" for public interest deliberation in EU and existence of "multi-level deficit" consisting
of democratic deficit as well as "rule of law deficit"); DEMOCRACY AND CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE

IN THE UNION OF EUROPE (Richard Bellamy et al. eds., 1995) (examining resources and appropriate
foundations of politics for European Constitution and legitimacy given democratic deficit resulting
from leaders' and politicians' insensitivity); THE DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (William

Wallace ed., 1990) (consisting of essays describing European integration with review of
intergovernmental and supranational decision-making bodies and evolution of political bodies within
European Community, and concluding with idea of democratic deficit due to court's taking substitute
role of legislator and lack of legislature elected by people subject only to executive checking); THE
DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN UNION (Roy Pryce ed., 1987) (discussing factors contributing to European
integration prior to creation of European Union); EUROPE: THE IMPOSSIBLE STATUS Quo 38-40

(Renhaud Dehousse ed., Caroline Morgan trans., 1997) (proposing democratization of decision
making as solution to legitimacy problems); EUROPEAN IDENTITY AND THE SEARCH FOR LEGITIMACY
64-80,95-105 (Soledad Garcfa ed., 1993) (including essays illustrating division in European community
with resultant effects on European governance, politics, and unification and its impact on European
democratic deficit); THE EUROPEAN UNION: How DEMOCRATIC IS IT? 5-9 (Svein S. Andersen & Kjell
A. Eliassen eds., 1996) (depicting democratic deficit as existing where there is lack of parliamentary
system of government which includes a constitution, parliament, and party system); EUROPEAN
UNION: POWER AND POLICY-MAKING (Jeremy Richardson ed., 1996) (providing overview of policy

making in European Union and including discussion of democratic deficit, citing concerns due to
Commission's unaccountability, absence of transparency, and individual citizens' lack of input);
STEPHEN GEORGE, POLITICS AND POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 35-56 (3d ed. 1996)
(focusing on complex decision-making process in European Union and theoretical underpinnings of
European integration and suggesting characterization of European Community as "multi-level
governance"); LEGAL ISSUES OF THE MAASTRICHT TREATY (David O'Keeffe & Patrick M. Twomey

eds., 1994) (surveying legal issues following Maastricht treaty, including subsidiarity and European
Union citizenship as means of fixing democratic deficit); LOBBYING IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

(Sonia Mazey & Jeremy Richardson eds., 1993) (addressing system of lobbying in Europe at both
national and European Community levels and predicting political stabilization to emerge in balance
between policy makers and interest groups); LOBBYING THE EUROPEAN UNION: COMPANIES, TRADE
ASSOCIATIONS AND ISSUE GROUPS (R.H. Pedler & M.P.C.M. Van Schendelen eds., 1994) (showing

through case studies lobbying's informal influence on decision-making process at European Union
level); MAASTRICHT AND BEYOND: BUILDING THE EUROPEAN UNION 157-228 (Andrew Duff et al.

eds., 1994) (analyzing Maastricht Treaty's historical and future impact on Europe and remedies to
system's weaknesses); NEILL NUGENT, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

(3d ed. 1994) (looking broadly at history, creation, evolution, institutions, actors, operations, and
policies of European Union); PHILIP RAWORTH, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN THE EUROPEAN

COMMUNITY (1993) (reviewing role of Council, Commission, and Parliament in European Community
legislation, attributing democratic deficit to dominance of Council in process of legislation and
reviewing reforms); MARTIN WESTLAKE, THE COMMISSION AND THE PARLIAMENT: PARTNERS AND
RIVALS IN THE EUROPEAN POLICY-MAKING PROCESS (1994) (discussing relationship and interactions
between European Commission and Parliament, with Parliament legitimizing proposals of European

Commission); Juliet

Lodge, EC Policymaking: Institutional Dynamics, in THE EUROPEAN

COMMUNITY AND THE CHALLENGE OF THE FUTURE 1 (Juliet Lodge ed., 2d ed. 1993) (detailing
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Originally, the EU provided no opportunities for direct citizen involvement
in its institutions. Not until 1979, thirty years after the establishment of the first
Council of Europe, 24 6 did the member nations first allow citizens to participate
directly in the EU government by voting for representatives. 247 The resulting
representative body was initially called the "Assembly" because some countries
objected to the authoritative ring of the term "Parliament. '248 Furthermore,
despite some changes in the name and role of the European Parliament over the
years, 249 its power pales next to that of the European Commission because it
'250
"lacks the normal parliamentary authority to initiate legislation.
EU proponents more seriously examined the democratic deficit when the
Danes refused to ratify the Maastricht Treaty in a 1992 referendum. Danish
representatives, in negotiating an alternative, demanded more openness in the
decision-making process. 251 Jacques Delors, the President of the EU
Commission, conceded that "Europe must become more democratic or Europe
252
will disappear."
Some argued that "more democracy" would provide more social legitimacy
for the EU. 25 3 An intergovernmental conference held in Turin on March 29, 1996

attempts by European Parliament to resolve democratic deficit in European Community resulting
from "inadequate parliamentary influence over the Commission and Council"); Philip Norton,
National Parliaments and the European Union: Where to From Here, in LAWMAKING IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION 209 (Paul Craig & Carol Harlow eds., 1998) (defining democratic deficit as "an
absence by the elected representatives of the people in the decision-making process within the
European Union"); J.H.H. Weiler, European Models: Polity, People and System, in LAWMAKING IN
THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra, at 1 (indicating problems of European integration, including
remoteness, lack of legitimacy and transparency, and democratic deficit); Shirley Williams, Sovereignty
and Accountability in the European Community, in THE NEW EUROPEAN COMMUNITY:
DECISIONMAKING AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 155 (Robert 0. Keohane & Stanley Hoffmann eds.,
1991) (discussing democratic deficit in terms of power exercised by unelected civil servants).
246. MATHIJSEN, supra note 193, at 12 n.2. The Council of Europe is a distinct body from the
European Council, which was "institutional[ized]" by the Maastricht treaty in 1992. Id. at 18.
247. MATHUSEN, supra note 193, at 16 (noting that first elections under Direct Universal
Suffrage Act held in 1979 brought legitimacy to the European Communities); see also Council
Decision 76/787, Act Concerning the Election of the Representatives of the Assembly by Direct
Universal Suffrage, 1976 O.J. (L 278) 1 (EC) (providing for election of European Parliament on single
day in May or June 1978).
248. MATHIJSEN, supra note 193, at 53.
249. Id.; see also Grfinne de Btirca, The Institutional Development of the EU: A Constitutional
Analysis, in THE EVOLUTION OF EU LAW, supra note 197, at 55, 57-59 (noting that the European
Parliament "began life as a purely consultative body and now exercises a range of functions from
consultation to shared legislative powers").
250. Sieberson, supra note 213, at 192 & n.156; see also id. at 210 ("ITihe Draft Constitution
would enhance the stature of the European Parliament . . .but the EP would still lack two critical
competences of a traditional parliament. It would not be able to initiate legislation, and it would lack
full oversight powers over the EU executives, namely, the Commission, the Council of Ministers and
the European Council.").
251. SETALA, supra note 10, at 131-32.
252. Kaufmann & Schiller, supra note 162, § 2.3.
253. See Bogdanor, supra note 241, at 176 (arguing that presidential system would increase
citizens' interest in EU affairs).
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began efforts to move the EU "closer to its citizens" and to make its institutions
"more democratic."2 54 Progress was slow. By July of 2001, the European
Commission had adopted a White Paper that recommended "sweeping proposals
for EU institutional reform" 255 to move the Union "from a diplomatic to a
of good
democratic process." 256 The White Paper justified reform on "principles
257
governance," including openness, participation, and accountability.
As a result, the constitution was to be created through a convention, which
"for the first time [allowed] for all European and national viewpoints to be
expressed in a broad, open and transparent debate." 258 The public participated in
the constitution drafting process, and an Internet site was created both to
document the proceedings and to invite public comment. 259 While some believed
260
that the draft constitution did not adequately address democratization issues,
advocates were able to inject two direct democracy provisions into the draft: (1)
citizen referendums to ratify the EU Constitution, and (2) the European
261
Citizens' Initiative.
1.

Direct Democracy in the Ratification Process

The drafters left the method of ratifying the 474-page EU Constitution
within the discretion of the government of each country, 262 and most

254. MATHIJSEN, supra note 193. at 21-22. Efforts were taken to make the Union "more
democratic, more transparent and more effective ... in response to the expectations of the people of
Europe." EUROPA PAMPHLET, supra note 212, at 4; see also Laeken Declaration, supra note 208, at 21
(calling on the EU to resolve the challenge of "bring[ing] citizens, and primarily the young, closer to
the European design and the European institutions").
255. Sieberson, supra note 213, at 174.
256. Commission White Paper on European Governance, at 30, COM (2001) 428 final (July 25,
2001), availableat http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/cnc/2001/com20010428en01.pdf.
257. Id. at 10.
258. EUROPA PAMPHLET, supranote 212, at 4.

259. The Internet site can be accessed at http://european-convention.eu.int. For additional
information about the comments received during drafting, see http://europa.eu.int/constitution/
futurum/indexen.htm.
260. For example, when the BBC asked two observers whether the EU Draft Constitution was
democratic, Kirsty Hughes of the Centre for European Policy Studies provided the negative response,
opining: "Executive power is jumbled up and shared out in an entirely confused manner in this new
constitution, with little heed to legitimacy, accountability or simplicity." Head-to-head:Is EU Blueprint
Democratic?, BBC NEWS, June 20, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.ukl/1low/world/europe/3006156.stm; see
also Sieberson, supra note 213, at 225 ("Nothing in the Commission-related provisions of the Draft
Constitution could fairly be described as further democratizing the European Union.").
261. EU Treaty, supra note 189, art. 1-47(4). Another effort made by the EU Constitution to
keep government connected more closely to the people is the "subsidiarity principle." This principle
requires that "decisions must be taken at the lowest possible level, whether local, regional or national,
and only those decisions that require EU-wide action are taken in the central institutions." Breyer,
supra note 218. This concept appears to be similar to the United States concept of federalism, and as
Justice Breyer points out, would seem to be equally problematic in enforcement. Id.; see also EUROPA
PAMPHLET, supra note 212, at 13 (describing purpose of subsidiarity to be ensuring decisions are taken
at a level closest to the citizens).
262. EU Treaty, supra note 189, art. 1-58.2

20061

REFERENDUM DEMOCRACY

governments initially were committed to allowing their citizens to register their
approval or disapproval through referendums. 263 The first nine countries to
address the prospective EU Constitution voted for ratification. 264 Spain held the
first citizen referendum on the issue in February 2005, and seventy-seven percent
of the voters that participated in that election cast their ballots in favor of the
proposed constitution. 265 Just three months later, however, French voters
derailed the ratification train by rejecting the EU Constitution in a May
referendum.2 66 Dutch voters followed suit three days later when they also voted
267
a resounding "no" in the first referendum ever held in the Netherlands.
Although these results were not a total surprise, 268 some argue that citizen
rejection of the choices of their political leaders has stung269 and has "plunged"
270
the "European experiment... into serious confusion."
Nevertheless, the ratification process continues. 271 Despite the "no" votes in
France and the Netherlands, more than half of the twenty-seven member states

263. KEOHANE, supra note 212, at 4. At the time of this Article, only six of the member states
explicitly declined to do so: Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Malta, and Sweden.
264. Richard Bernstein, Charterfor the European Union Meets Resistance, N.Y. TIMES, May 22,
2005, at 8 (indicating that Austria, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia,
and Spain all ratified the EU Constitution by parliamentary vote, though Spain first held nonbinding
referendum followed by parliamentary ratification).
265. Spain Voters Approve EU Charter, BBC NEWS, Feb. 20, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
europe/4280841.stm. Seventeen percent voted against. Id.
266. On Sunday, May 29, 2005, "about 70 percent of France's registered 41.8 million voters"
turned out, and the "no" votes prevailed in a tally by fifty-five percent to forty-five percent. Elaine
Sciolino, French Voters Soundly Reject European Pact, N.Y. TIMES, May 30,2005, at Al.
267. On Wednesday, June 1, 2005, about sixty-three percent of Dutch voters registered their
opinion on the referendum. The final tally was sixty-two percent "no" and thirty-eight percent "yes."
Marlise Simons, Dutch Voters Solidly Reject New European Constitution,N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2005, at
A10.
268. Several months before the election, journalists noted that French support for the treaty had
dropped from sixty-four percent in September 2004 to fifty-nine percent in January 2005, causing
French President Jacques Chirac to move the referendum vote earlier. Aurore Wanlin, Will the French
Vote 'Non'?, CER BULL., Feb./Mar. 2005, http/:www.cer.org.uk/articles/40_wanlin.html.
269. Simons, supra note 267 (noting that two-thirds of Dutch Parliament were in favor but twothirds of Dutch citizens voted against it).
270. Christopher Dickey, Europe's Dream Deferred, NEWSWEEK, June 13, 2005, at 34,35; see also
Ved Nanda, European Union, Up Close, DENVER POST, July 31, 2005, at E5 ("[I]t is in nobody's
interest ...to see a weakened Europe with fragmentary policies."). In contrast to the dire predictions,
John Palmer, director of the Brussels-based European Policy Center says the votes will simply require
"two or three years of reflection." Dickey, supra; see also Sieberson, supra note 213, at 259
(considering predications that EU Constitution will last 50 years to be "wishful thinking at best").
271. Fifty-six and one-half percent of voters in Luxembourg approved the EU Constitution in a
referendum vote on July 10, 2005. The European Union Constitution: Ratification,
http://www.unizar.es/euroconstitucion/TreatiesfTreaty-Const-Rat.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2007).
Furthermore, French President Jacques Chirac and former German Chancellor Schroeder have
"called on other member states to press ahead with ratification .. .[and former] Polish Foreign
Minister Adam Rotfeld said his nation plans to forge ahead with its referendum despite Britain's
decision." Ed Johnson, Associated Press, Britain Shelves EU Vote: French, Dutch Defeats Delay
Referendum, BOULDER DAILY CAMERA, June 7,2005, at lB.
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now have approved the proposed constitution. 272 Furthermore, member
countries continue to be committed to citizen referendums on the issue of
ratification even though the ultimate adoption of the proposed constitution
273
remains in doubt.
The success rate for earlier citizen referendums that authorized each
country's participation in the EU was very high: the citizens of only one of the
fifteen countries voted against joining.274 From the perspective of direct
democracy, the growing number of states that have used referendums in the past
and that plan to continue to use referendums to legitimize the EU Constitution
has put pressure on other countries to do the same. 275 As one commentator
notes, "[t]he genie cannot be put back into the bottle. After so many
referend[ums] on the constitution it will be difficult for governments not to put
' 276
other kinds of EU issues to a public vote.

272. See The European Union Constitution: Ratification, http://www.unizar.es/euroconstitucion/
Treaties/TreatyConstRat.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2007) (providing the ratification status, method,
and, where applicable, outcome for all member nations). Eighteen nations have now ratified the
treaty. The newest nations are: Belgium (May 19, 2005), Latvia (June 2,2005), Cyprus (June 30, 2005),
Malta (July 7, 2005), Luxembourg (July 10, 2005), Estonia (May 9, 2006), and Finland (December 5,
2006). Additionally, Bulgaria and Romania ratified the Constitution before joining the EU. Sixteen
nations ratified the constitution solely by a parliamentary vote. Luxembourg and Spain held both a
nonbinding, "consultive" referendum and a parliamentary vote. France and the Netherlands held
referendums in which voters rejected ratification of the EU Constitution. Of the seven remaining
member nations, six plan to use a referendum procedure to ratify the constitution (Denmark, Czech
Republic, Ireland, Poland, Portugal, and the United Kingdom) and referendum plans have either been
postponed or suspended in all of these countries, and one plans to ratify using only a parliamentary
procedure (Sweden). Id.
273. Ironically, even though political pressure from the announcement that Britain would hold a
referendum may have helped force the vote in France, Britain has now shelved its plans to hold a
referendum on ratification. Nicholas Watt, Resounding No Shocks European Leaders: Vote Reduces
Prospectof British Poll, GUARDIAN, June 2, 2005, at 5 ("Mr. Chirac called a referendum only after his
hand was forced by the British prime minister's decision to hold a poll."). Although referendums on
ratification of the EU Constitution have been postponed in Denmark, Ireland, Poland, and Portugal,
as of yet, political leaders have not abandoned the referendum process for ratification. See
Ratification, supra note 272 (displaying each member nation's ratification procedure and progress and
showing ongoing commitment to referendums).
274. KEOHANE, supra note 212, at 3. In 2001, Irish citizens voted against the Nice Treaty because
they were concerned with defense policy-even though the treaty did not affect Ireland's neutrality.
Id.
275. Although some commentators have suggested a loss of sovereignty is the reason for the
citizen rejection of the EU Constitution, the most frequent rationale for the French vote is concern
about Turkey's entry into the Union. See, e.g., Dickey, supra note 270 (noting European fears that
Muslim Turkey could join EU); see also Andrew Moravcsik, Europe Without Illusions, PROSPECT, July
2005, availableat http://www.prospect-magazine.co.uk/pdfarticle.php?id=6939 (suggesting "notion that
democratisation and the European ideal could legitimate the EU" was misguided and if added without
justification could cause "the European public to decisively reject an institution as deeply embedded
as the EU").
276. KEOHANE, supra note 212, at 5; see also MARK LEONARD, CTR. FOR EUROPEAN REFORM,
DEMOCRACY tN EUROPE: How THE EU CAN SURVIVE IN AN AGE OF REFERENDUMS 4 (2006),

http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/essay-democracy-march06.pdf ("Of course, it is referendums that have
made the biggest difference to EU politics. In the future any move to widen or deepen the EU will
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Direct Democracy through the European Citizens' Initiative

One of the most innovative democratic additions to the EU Constitution is
a provision for a nationwide referendum that allows EU citizens to initiate
legislation. Delegates added article 1-47(4) late in the drafting process, almost as
an afterthought. 277 In form, the European Citizens' Initiative authorizes a
citizen-sponsored advisory referendum. Such a referendum process would allow
EU citizens to participate in setting the agenda within the EU's unique
legislative system.
Article 1-47 of the EU Constitution originally contained broad hortatory
provisions noting the importance of democracy, but with little content. 278 Titled
"The principle of participatory democracy," the initial draft contained three
subsections. The first stated that EU institutions should give citizens "the
opportunity to make known and publicly exchange their views." 279 The second
subsection required the EU institutions to "maintain an open, transparent and
regular dialogue with representative associations and civil society." 280 The third
provided that the Commission should "carry out broad consultations with parties
concerned in order to ensure that the Union's actions are coherent and
281
transparent.
None of these sections provided any specifics on implementation. Through
extensive lobbying 282 and negotiations, 283 a fourth subsection addressing
referendums was added in the final draft just eight days before submission to the

require referendums. The next time a new treaty is negotiated, national leaders will find it difficult not
to put the result to a popular vote.").
277. Section 4 was not added until one of the very latest drafts of the constitution. European
Convention, Secretariat, Text of Part I and Part II of Constitution, art. 1-46, CONV 797/1/03 REV 1
(June 12, 2003), available at http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/03/cv00/cv00797-re01en3.pdf;
European Convention, Secretariat, Revised Text of Part I, art. 1-46, CONV 797/03 EN (June 10, 2003),
available at http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/03/cvOO/cv00797en03.pdf. For a brief history of the
European Citizen's Initiative and the story of its inclusion in the European Constitution, see
http://www.democracy-international.org/story.html.
278. Initially, this section was contained in article 1-46, but was subsequently moved to 1-47 in the
final version. European Convention, Secretariat, Draft Treaty for European Constitution, art. 1-46,
CONV 797/03 EN (June 10, 2003), available at http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/03/cvO0/
cv00797en03.pdf; EU Treaty, supra note 189, art. 1-47.
279. EU Treaty, supra note 189, at art. 1-47(1).
280. Id. art. 1-47(2).
281. Id. art. 1-47(3).
282. For a description of the lobbying process used by Democracy International, see
http://www.democracy-international.org/story.html. For a description of the results from the Initiative
and Referendum Institute Europe, see http://www.iri-europe.org.
283. According to Gisela Stuart, a member of the UK Parliament, the debates were "too
painful/tedious/ irritating to recall the horse trading and hijacking of the national parliament group by
a small caucus." E-mail from Gisela Stuart, Member, UK Parliament, to Diane Burkhardt, Faculty
Services Liaison, Sturm College of Law (June 24,2005, 17:18 MST) (on file with author). Furthermore,
she noted that the "people's petition [was] a trade off for the call for a referendum" because although
the German Green party supported participatory democracy, the SPD party of the German
government "wanted to avoid having to hold a referendum on the Constitution at all costs." Id.
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European Council at the Thessloniki meeting on June 20, 2003.284 The new
article 1-47(4) creates the European Citizens' Initiative, "the very first
transnational citizens' initiative right" to sponsor an advisory referendum. 285 To
qualify, a referendum must be introduced by not less than "one million citizens
who are nationals of a significant number of Member States" for "appropriate
proposal[s] on matters where citizens consider that a legal act of the Union is
required for the purposes of implementing the Constitution. 2 86 The provision
further provides that "European laws shall determine the provisions for
procedures and conditions required for such a citizens' initiative. "287
The provision has a number of problems, many arising from its vagueness.
Although it should be fairly easy for proponents to get a proposal qualified for a
vote-one million signatures is a very small percentage of the total EU
population of 480 million 28 -the article does not define "significant," leaving
unclear the number of member states that must participate. 289 In addition, the
article does not define "appropriate proposal[s]." Conceivably, referendums on
certain topic areas may fall outside the scope of the provision. Finally, the
provision has few specifics concerning execution, and reliance on the law of each
member state for implementation may create a logistical nightmare.
Despite its problems, some believe the European Citizens' Initiative
represents a positive development. 290 Article 1-47(4) promotes an intriguing

284. Valery Giscard d'Estaing, Oral Report to the European Council (June 20, 2003), in J.
DEMOCRACY, Oct. 2003, at 60-61 (presenting measure to European Council and signifying his support
as Convention President). The fourth subsection states:
4. Not less than one million citizens who are nationals of a significant number of Member
States may take the initiative of inviting the Commission, within the framework of its
powers, to submit any appropriate proposal on matters where citizens consider that a legal
act of the Union is required for the purpose of implementing the Constitution. European
laws shall determine the provisions for the procedures and conditions required for such a
citizens' initiative, including the minimum number of Member States from which such
citizens must come.
EU Treaty, supra note 189, art. 1-47(4).
285. Bruno Kaufmann, The European Initiative & Referendum Challenge, in THE EUROPEAN
CONSTITUTION: BRINGING IN THE PEOPLE 8, 9 (Fabrice Filliez & Bruno Kaufmann eds., 2004),
availableat http://www.iri-europe.org/documents/euro-const.pdf [hereinafter BRINGING].
286. EU Treaty, supranote 189, art. 1-47(4).
287. Id.
288. This effective qualifying percentage of only 0.20% is one of the lowest in Europe. Only
Italy's referendum abrogativo has a lower qualifying percentage of 0.08%. Kaufmann & Schiller, supra
note 162, § 4.1 (calculating effective qualifying percentages for six member nations and the EU as a
whole).
289. Moreover, the number may be relative and change as the size of the EU increases. Nor does
the term indicate whether a qualitative element also exists. The approach could permit submission by
accumulating the requisite number of signatures in the smallest member states.
290. Roger Briesch, President, Eur. Econ. & Soc. Comm., Statement at the Plenary Session of
the European
Economic
and Social
Committee
9 (July
16, 2003), available at
http://www.eesc.europa.eu/convention/docs/InterventionBriesch-sp-eesc_16_07-2003-en.pdf.
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interaction between the referendum process and the European Commission and
offers significant potential as an agenda-setting tool. 291
Most citizen-sponsored referendums bypass governmental leaders
completely. Citizens set the agenda by drafting the referendum language. Then
the proposal becomes positive law if a majority of citizens vote for it, even if a
majority of elected representatives disagree. In contrast, most referendums that
pass through the traditional legislative process are government sponsored.
Governmental leaders generally set the agenda for these proposals by drafting
the initial language and then simply seeking validation by submitting the
referendums they drafted to citizens for a vote. The EU Constitution has created
an alternative: A citizen-drafted measure that is only advisory and thus does not
bypass the traditional legislative process.
Under the European Citizens' Initiative, the people are allowed to
participate as an integral part of the unitary system for creating EU law by
"design[ing] and . . . promot[ing] a political proposal within the law-making
process of the Union." 292 Citizens draft the language of a proposal, and citizens
vote on that language. Yet, to become law, EU government officials must
deliberate and vote on any measure through the usual process for EU legislation.
Therefore, the European Citizens' Initiative allows EU citizens to use
referendums to "invite" the European Commission to submit legislation.
Although this limited grant of power to citizens to "invite" legislation may seem
insignificant, in fact, article 1-47(4) "place[s] a significant minority of European
voters on a par with a majority in the European Parliament. '293 Thus, the
European Citizens' Initiative uses language identical to the wording which gives
the European Parliament a similar right to "invite" the Commission to consider
legislation. 294 Consequently, it holds great symbolic significance when it equates
the power of the people to that of the European Parliament.

291. Kaufmann & Schiller, supra note 162, § 1.
292. Victor Cuesta, Designing the First Transnational Citizen Initiative, in BRINGING, supra note

285, at 30, 30.
293. Kaufmann, supra note 285, at 9; see also Jrgen Meyer, Questions & Answers About the New
Citizens Right, in BRINGING, supra note 285, at 26, 26 (distinguishing new right to propose
referendums directly to European Commission from mere right to petition European Parliament).
Under article 1-47(4):
[T]he people get the same right as the [European Parliament] has at present. The wording
of Art. 46-and that was very important for getting the majority in the Convention-is
identical with the wording which at present gives the [European Parliament] the right to
address the Commission, to use the right of initiative. As you know, that right belongs to the
Commission. So, it is not a way of addressing the [European Parliament]; the [European
Parliament] will of course become involved, will discuss it, but the [European Parliament]
cannot have the right to stop or delay such an initiative. It is addressed to the Commission.

Id.
294. Council Decision 76/787/ECSC, EEC, Euratom, Act of 20 September 1976 on Direct
Elections, 1976 O.J. (L 278) 1 ("The European Parliament may, acting by a majority of its Members,
request the Commission to submit any appropriate proposal on matters on which it considers that a
Community act is required for the purpose of implementing this Treaty.").
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The question remains "whether the Commission will meaningfully respond
to an initiative 'invitation.' 295 Although the Commission has never refused to
consider an invitation from the European Parliament, 296 the invitation language
of article 1-47(4) seems to grant the Commission that discretion. Furthermore, a
citizen-sponsored measure still must survive the legislative process. Yet, the
provision, like advisory referendums in other countries, would make it politically
difficult for the Commission to completely ignore a request from citizens to put
297
an item on the agenda.
Both direct democracy advocates and the EU establishment tout this new
European Citizens' Initiative as one of the leading innovations to promote
legitimacy and democracy in the EU.2 98 By allowing its citizens a voice within the
existing legislative process, the EU attempts to respond to the concern that
democracy must "be measured by the closeness, responsiveness,
'299
representativeness, and accountability of the governors to the governed.
VI.

REFERENDUMS IN THE UNITED STATES

Citizen participation in national affairs through referendums has a long
tradition in Europe, and the trend toward allowing participation keeps increasing
worldwide. Nevertheless, the United States, once a leader in the concept of
democracy, has fallen behind and now rests as one of only four major
democracies in the world that have never held a nationwide referendum. 300
Implementing a system of mandatory citizen-initiated referendums could not
survive constitutional challenge in the United States. The efforts of the Founding
Fathers to devise a government with limited direct democracy effectively
blocked efforts in this direction. Nonetheless, an avenue for direct democracy
remains available. Under the Petition Clause of the First Amendment, the

295. Sieberson, supra note 213, at 252.
296. The European Parliament has only the power to "suggest new legislation-but not force it."
MATH1JSEN, supra note 193, at 100.
297. See generally EUR. CITIZEN ACTION SERV., EUROPEAN CITIZEN INITIATIVES (2004),
http://www.ecas.org/fileuploads/664.pdf (arguing that consideration of citizens' initiatives fosters
atmosphere of "participatory democracy").
298. EUROPA PAMPHLET, supra note 212, at 13 (describing the citizen initiative under heading
"A legitimate and democratic Union"); see also Kaufmann & Schiller, supra note 162, at 3, 6 (stressing
role of initiative in becoming more democratic); Democracy International, European Citizens'
Initiative, http://www.democracy-international.org/eci.htmil (last visited Jan. 5, 2007) (urging public to
support ECI independent of ratification of EU Constitution).
299. J.H.H. WEILER, THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE: "Do THE NEW CLOTHES HAVE AN
EMPEROR'?" AND OTHER ESSAYS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 81 (1999).

300. Morel, supranote 11, at 50 (stating that India, Israel, Japan, Netherlands, and United States
are the major democracies that have not had a national referendum). The Netherlands, however, held
a referendum on June 1, 2005, on the matter of EU Constitution ratification. Ratification, supra note
272. See also Dennis Polhill, Initiative & Referendum Institute, The Issue of a National Initiative
Process, http://www.iandrinstitute.org/National%201&R.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2007) (claiming that
national referendums are prevalent among the world's democracies and pointing to examples from
Switzerland, Norway, Germany, and Soviet Union).
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the Constitution, a system of
United States could institute, without amending
30 1
citizen-initiated nonbinding referendums.
A.

ConstitutionalProhibitionsAgainst Binding Referendums

A system that would permit citizens to pass binding referendums would not
pass constitutional muster absent an amendment to the Constitution. The
Constitution provides no express mechanism for these types of initiatives. Such
an approach also conflicts directly with the method of government ensconced in
the Constitution. 30 2 To become law, both the House and the Senate must pass
301. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law.., abridging.., the right of the
people ... to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.").
302. Furthermore, when debating the First Amendment, members of both the House and Senate
considered including a guarantee for "the people's right to instruct their Representatives" about how
to vote on specific legislation. Higginson, supra note 29, at 156 (quoting BILL OF RIGHTS HISTORY,
supra note 36, at 1052). "Both the House and Senate debated whether to include with the guarantees
of free speech, press, and petition, 'the people's right to instruct their Representatives."' Id.; see also
Emily Calhoun, Initiative Petition Reforms and the First Amendment, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 129, 131
n.10 (1995) (noting that during Bill of Rights debates, some felt voters should have right to "'instruct'
(or bind) their representatives to vote in a particular way on a given issue"). For general discussions of
the proposed right of instruction see 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 257-468, 685-792 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834),
reprintedin BILL OF RIGHTS HISTORY, supra note 36, at 1026, 1091-1103; GARRY WILLS, EXPLAINING
AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST 42-43, 223-24 (1981). See also 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 685-792 (Joseph Gales
ed., 1834), reprinted in BILL OF RIGHTS HISTORY, supra note 36, at 1096 (arguing that the right to

petition protects the right to bring nonbinding instructions to Congress's attention); Julian N. Eule,
JudicialReview of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1523-24 (1990) (discussing framers distrust of
majority rule and Federalists' successful efforts to keep right to instruct legislators out of First
Amendment). Frustration with the British government is what led the Framers to consider
incorporating a people's right to instruct their representatives in the First Amendment. Higginson,
supra note 29, at 156 (citing BILL OF RIGHTS HISTORY, supra note 36, at 1091-105). During the
ratification debates on the First Amendment in the House of Representatives, it was proposed to
include a right to instruct the legislature; the proposal failed. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 759-68 (Joseph
Gales ed., 1789) (forming the official description of the debates on instruction); see also Comment, On
Letting the Laity Litigate: The Petition Clause and Unauthorized Practice Rules, 132 U. PA. L. REV.
1515, 1524, n.42. (1984) (describing failure of proposed right of instruction). They rejected this process,
which appears to closely resemble that of a binding referendum, because they feared it would allow
the majority to control without the constitutional protections against factions mandated by the
deliberative process:
Members defeated the amendment because they feared that obligatory instructions would
subvert Congress' deliberative character and lead to irreconcilable factionalism.... Thus,
while refusing to vest individuals and groups with the power to bind Congress, and while
guarding jealously their discretion to judge and reject instructions as unwise, the Framers of
the Bill of Rights nonetheless maintained that citizens' 'instructions,' like petitions, would be
heard and considered.
Higginson, supra note 29, at 156. Madison disagreed with the right of instruction because it would
undermine the purposes of the representative form of government generally embodied in the
Constitution. Calhoun, supra, at 131-32. The congressmen also hotly debated whether to include a
provision whereby citizens would "instruct" their representatives. Id. at 133. Madison persuaded the
House to reject such a clause with these words:
Amendments of a doubtful nature will have a tendency to prejudice the whole system; the
proposition now suggested partakes highly of this nature .... The right of freedom of speech
is secured; the liberty of the press is expressly declared to be beyond the reach of this
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proposed legislation, and the President must sign it into law. A mandatory
referendum presumably would bypass this process and circumvent congressional
and presidential approval.
Past efforts to "end-run" the President's power to veto legislation have not
fared well. In INS v. Chadha,30 3 the United States Supreme Court declared that
unilateral action by the House of Representatives could not invalidate decisions
by the Executive Branch. 3°4 Such a "one-House veto" is unconstitutional, the
Court reasoned, because "the prescription for legislative action in Art. I, §§ 1, 7,
represents the Framers' decision that the legislative power of the Federal
Government be exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and
30 5
exhaustively considered, procedure."
Similarly, the Supreme Court has invalidated efforts to diminish Congress's
role in the legislative process. In Clinton v. New York, 30 6 the Supreme Court
concluded that the Line Item Veto had the "legal and practical effect" of
allowing the President to repeal portions of legislation without following the
constitutional procedure of vetoing an entire bill. 30 7 Consequently, the Court
concluded "that the Act's cancellation provisions violate Article I, § 7, of the
Constitution."' 30 8 Also, because the Line Item Veto Act does not follow "the
'finely wrought' procedure commanded by the Constitution," the Court did not
find it necessary to address "the District Court's alternative holding that the Act
Government; the people may therefore publicly address their representatives, may privately
advise them, or declare their sentiments by petition to the whole body; in all these ways they
may communicate their will.
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 766 (Gales and Seaton eds., 1789); see also Bernard Schwartz, Commentary to
Select Committee and Committee of the Whole, July-August, 1789, in BILL OF RIGHTS HISTORY, supra
note 36, at 1051-52 (reporting Madison's notion of sovereignty to be that "the people can change the
constitution if they please; but while the constitution exists, they must conform themselves to its
dictates"); Calhoun, supra, at 131 n.ll (stating Madison believed his version of First Amendment right
to petition would not undermine purposes of representative government embodied in Constitution).
303. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
304. Chadha,462 U.S. at 959.
305. Id. at 951. Section 7 of Article 1 provides in relevant part:
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall,
before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States; If he approve he
shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall
have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to
reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the
Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall
likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become a Law.
But in all such Cases the Votes of both Houses shall be determined by Yeas and Nays, and
the Names of the Persons voting for and against the Bill shall be entered on the Journal of
each House respectively. If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days
(Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in
like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its
Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law.
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7, cl.
2.
306. 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
307. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 438.
308. Id. at 448.
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'impermissibly disrupts the balance of powers among the three branches of
government.'

309

A mandatory citizen referendum, therefore, likely would meet the same fate
at the hands of the U.S. Supreme Court. To the extent such a referendum
mandated the adoption of legislation and sidestepped both Congress and the
President, Chadha and Clinton strongly indicate such a measure would not
survive constitutional scrutiny.
Efforts to implement a constitutional amendment for a direct, binding
referendum system in this country have occurred in the past and failed. 310 Such
an amendment also might be ill-advised because it would bypass the balanced,
deliberative process that is the hallmark of United States governance.
The failure to amend the Constitution to allow a national initiative or
referendum is not a result of any lack of effort. Between 1895 and 1943,
proponents submitted more than 108 proposals to amend the United States
31
Constitution to add a national initiative and referendum scheme. ' Most
recently, Mike Gravel, former senator from Alaska, has used the Internet to
garner support for a National Initiative For Democracy. 312 Although opinion
polls show that the majority of Americans back the concept of a national
initiative, 313 congressional disfavor with the process makes it unlikely a national
initiative will become law anytime soon.

309. Id. at 447-48 (quoting City of New York v. Clinton, 985 F. Supp. 168, 179 (D.D.C. 1998)).
310. See Polhill, supra note 300 (describing three failed attempts).
311. Id. For example, in 1896, the People's Party created the National Direct Legislation League
and elected Pomeroy to serve as secretary and president. GOEBEL, supra note 18, at 43. During the
Progressive Era, efforts to introduce a national initiative provided pressure that may have assisted in
enacting the Nineteenth Amendment permitting women's suffrage. On March 2, 1914, United States
Senator and former Colorado Governor John Shafroth introduced into Congress the Shafroth
National Suffrage Amendment. Polhill, supra note 300. The Amendment provided that women's
suffrage would be placed on the state ballot as a referendum item at the next state election whenever
eight percent of voters in a state consented by signing a petition. Id. The rationale behind the
legislation was to give those legislators who supported states' rights an acceptable option in adopting
suffrage legislation through state legislation rather than a federal amendment. CARRIE CHAPMAN
CATr & NETTIE ROGERS SHULER, WOMAN SUFFRAGE AND POLITICS: THE INNER STORY OF THE

SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT 246-47 (Univ. of Wash. Press 1926) (1923). A renewed interest in a national
initiative developed in the 1970s when Senator James Abourezk proposed a national statutory
initiative process. S.J. Res. 67, 95th Cong. (1977). Similar to other proposed national initiatives or
referendums, the resolution never made it out of committee. The resolution did provide for an
extensive Judiciary Committee hearing, however, establishing a formal record and a base of
knowledge on the national initiative platform. See generally Ronald J. Allen, The National Initiative
Proposal:A PreliminaryAnalysis, 58 NEB. L. REV. 965 (1979) (providing preliminary evaluation of
implications of national initiative proposal).
312. The nonprofit group sponsoring the measure, The Democracy Foundation, hosted a
symposium in Williamsburg, Virginia in February 2002, and requested supporting votes through the
Internet. Democracy Symposium, http://ni4d.us/symposium/index.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2007). The
Web site has links to more information about the National Initiative for Democracy cause and related
matters but has not been updated since the 2002 symposium. Id.
313. See CRONIN, supra note 26, at 4 (reporting fifty-eight percent of 1987 Gallup poll
respondents favored implementation of national advisory referendum); MAGLEBY, supranote 71, at 7,
12-14 (reporting that more than half of survey respondents in 1977-1981 favored national initiative).
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Advisory Referendums Under the Petition Clause

Although binding referendums may violate the legislative procedure
established in the Constitution, the Petition Clause appears to implicitly
authorize use of advisory referendums. The First Amendment explicitly provides
citizens with the right to petition the government. 314 Early cases acknowledged

314. While case law decided in the last one hundred years has given the Petition Clause little
independent content, often treating the clause as a right subsumed by free speech, such case law has
gained considerable attention from legal scholars. See generally Carol Rice Andrews, A Right of
Access to Court Under the Petition Clause of the First Amendment: Defining the Right, 60 OHIO ST. L.J.
557 (1999) (arguing Petition Clause is narrow, meaningful guarantee of citizens' right to seek redress
from courts); Calhoun, supra note 302 (contrasting Colorado's adversarial petition process with
Petition Clause, where "will of the people should transcend mere majority preference"); Emily
Calhoun, Voice in Government: The People, 8 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHics PUB. POL'Y 427 (1994)
(arguing petition right offers protection beyond free speech, including protection from being excluded
from governing process); Frederick, supra note 31 (arguing congressional imposition of gag rule
"quashed" right to petition as means of communicating people's grievances to government); Anita
Hodgkiss, Petitioning and the Empowerment Theory of Practice,96 YALE L.J. 569 (1987) (arguing that
Petition Clause as understood by Supreme Court guarantees no more than freedom of speech);
Lawson & Seidman, supra note 29 (discussing nonobligation of congressional response as limitation of
right to petition); Mark, supra note 32 (stating that political climate renders right to petition
increasingly obsolete); Kevin Francis O'Neill, The FirstAmendment's Petition Clause as an Alternative
Basisfor ChallengingVoter Initiativesthat Burden the Enactment of Anti-DiscriminationProtectionfor
Gays, Lesbians, and Bisexuals, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 131 (2000) (arguing Petition Clause is promising
alternative to equal protection and substantive due process as basis for vindicating gay, lesbian, and
bisexual rights in certain cases); James E. Pfander, Sovereign Immunity and the Right to Petition:
Toward a First Amendment Right to Pursue Judicial Claims Against the Government, 91 Nw. U. L.
REV. 899 (1997) (arguing doctrine of sovereign immunity is displaced by rights granted in Petition
Clause); Eric Schnapper, 'Libelous' Petitions for Redress of Grievances-BadHistoriographyMakes
Worse Law, 74 IOWA L. REV. 303 (1989) (arguing Supreme Court's interpretation of the Petition
Clause is inconsistent with its historical background); Smith, supra note 29 (arguing Supreme Court's
decision in McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S, 479 (1985), reflects inadequate understanding of history and
purpose of the right to petition); Julie M. Spanbauer, The First Amendment Right to Petition
Government for a Redress of Grievances: Cut From a Different Cloth, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 15
(1993) (arguing Supreme Court incorrectly treats right to petition as right coextensive with other First
Amendment expressive rights); Rebecca A. Clar, Comment, Martin v. City of Del City: A Lost
Opportunity to Restore the First Amendment Right to Petition, 74 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 483 (2000)
(arguing public employee's retaliation claim in violation of the petition right deserves a separate
standard of analysis distinct from freedom of speech's "public concern" requirement); Comment,
supra note 302 (arguing courts have never weighed in on substantive nature of petition right);
Higginson, supra note 29 (concluding Southern "gag" proponents subsumed petition right with free
speech despite colonial practice linking petitioning to duty of legislative response); Note, A Petition
Clause Analysis of Suits Against the Government: Implications for Rule 11 Sanctions, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 1111 (1993) (arguing that right to petition must be analyzed independently of Free Speech
Clause and Freedom of Press Clause). In fact, however, the right predated free speech. 1 ANNALS OF
CONG. 685-792 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834), reprintedin BILL OF RIGHTS HISTORY, supra note 36, at 102627. As Chief Justice Burger related in one case:
The historical roots of the Petition Clause long antedate the Constitution. In 1689, the Bill of
Rights exacted of William and Mary stated: "[It] is the Right of the Subjects to petition the
King." 1 Wm. & Mary, Sess. 2, ch. 2. This idea reappeared in the Colonies when the Stamp
Act Congress of 1765 included a right to petition the King and Parliament in its Declaration
of Rights and Grievances. See 1 B. Schwartz, The Bill of Rights - Documentary History 198
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that the right to petition included a right to submit legislative proposals. These
same cases, however, made clear that the right to submit did not come with a
collateral obligation on the part of Congress to act. Nonetheless, in the early
days of the Republic, Congress in fact had in place rules that made consideration
mandatory. These internal rules that required Congress to consider citizen
petitions lasted only until 1836. In that year, Congress amended its rules to
prohibit receipt of any petitions addressing the abolition of slavery, effectively
putting a gag on the topic.3 15
Although the constitutionality of the gag rule was never challenged in the
courts, 3 16 the Supreme Court has indicated that the right to petition does not
embody a corresponding right to a response. In Smith v. Arkansas State Highway
Employees Local 1315,317 the Court noted:

(1971). And the Declarations of Rights enacted by many state conventions contained a right
to petition for redress of grievances. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights (1776).
McDonald, 472 U.S. at 482-83. Other cases have discussed the clause as part of the right to assembly.
See, e.g., United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 551 (1875) (considering enforcement of a Louisiana
statute that restricted rights of citizens to band together). In Cruikshank, the Court did not distinguish
petitioning from assembly, but instead blurred petitioning into the assembly right by stating: "The
right of the people peaceably to assemble for the purpose of petitioning Congress for a redress of
grievances." Id. at 552. Thus, the Court's treatment of the petition right has been eclipsed by the right
of free speech, even though free speech derived from the right to petition, which long predated the
speech right. Furthermore, when James Madison first introduced the Bill of Rights, he proposed that
the right to petition be in a separate amendment distinct from the amendment containing the rights for
free speech and press. Higginson, supra note 29, at 155-56 ("[W]hen Madison introduced his proposed
list of amendments on June 8, 1789, he separated the clause for the rights of assembly, consultation,
and petition from the clause containing the free expression guarantees of speech and the press. The
express function of the assembly-petition clause was to protect citizens 'applying to the Legislature...
for a redress of their grievances"' (quoting BILL OF RIGHTS HISTORY, supra note 36, at 1026). Finally,
McDonald, the Supreme Court's most recent case on the Petition Clause, concluded that the Petition
Clause did not provide absolute immunity to a defendant who was charged for expressing libelous
falsehoods about a candidate for United States Attorney in letters to the President. McDonald, 472
U.S. at 485. In deciding that petitions to the President were not entitled to absolute immunity, the
Court noted:
The Petition Clause, however, was inspired by the same ideals of liberty and democracy that
gave us the freedoms to speak, publish, and assemble. These First Amendment rights are
inseparable, and there is no sound basis for granting greater constitutional protection to
statements made in a petition to the President than other First Amendment expressions.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
315. 12 REG. DEB. 4052 (1836) (Henry Pinckney committee resolution on May 18, 1836). This
solution offended many because it changed the House procedures for dealing with some petitions,
creating content-based restrictions. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text for a description of
Congress's elimination of citizen petitions as meaningful agenda-setting tools.
316. Frederick, supra note 31, at 131. In 1836, the Supreme Court was "dominated by
southerners," and just thirty-three years after Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803),
judicial review of congressional action was a relatively novel concept. Id. at 131 n.89. Furthermore, it
was unclear what remedy the abolitionists would request because there was no precedent for a "writ of
mandamus to Congress," and no specific order from the Court could address "a continuing 'violation"'
of petition rights. Id.
317. 441 U.S. 463 (1979).
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The First Amendment right to associate and to advocate "provides no
guarantee that a speech will persuade or that advocacy will be
effective." The public employee surely can associate .... But the First
Amendment does not impose any affirmative obligation on the
government to listen, to respond
or, in this context, to recognize the
318
association and bargain with it.
319
Other cases have made similar pronouncements.
Even though the right of petition may not include a right of response, it still
320
embodies more than the free speech right to address elected representatives.
Although its placement at the end of the First Amendment might make it appear
to be an afterthought, in fact "[pletitioning was the most important form of
political speech the colonists had known, not just because of its expressive
character, but also because of the ways in which it structured politics and the
'321
processes of government.
318. Smith, 441 U.S. at 464-65.
319. Similarly, in Minnesota State Boardfor Community College v. Knight, the Court found that
the First Amendment did not guarantee faculty members a voice in negotiations. Instead, their
representatives could set policy. 465 U.S. 271, 283 (1984) ("The Constitution does not grant to
members of the public generally a right to be heard by public bodies making decisions of policy."). The
Court had rejected the faculty members' claims, stating that:
Nothing in the First Amendment or in this Court's case law interpreting it suggests that the
rights to speak, associate, and petition require government policymakers to listen or respond
to individuals' communications on public issues .... No other constitutional provision has
been advanced as a source of such a requirement. Nor, finally, can the structure of
government established and approved by the Constitution provide the source. It is inherent
in a republican form of government that direct public participation in government
policymaking is limited. Disagreement with public policy and disapproval of officials'
responsiveness.. . is to be registered principally at the polls.
Id. at 285 (internal citations omitted).
320. The right to circulate petitions to initiate a citizen-sponsored referendum is distinct from the
right to submit such a referendum to Congress under the Petition Clause. Courts that have reviewed
the issue have declared that circulation of petitions falls under the protections of the right to free
speech. They are protected because those petitions constitute statements of an issue and allow
individuals to speak to other citizens about their ideas. The United States Supreme Court recognized
that "circulation of a petition involves the type of interactive communication concerning political
change that is appropriately described as 'core political speech."' Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 421-22
(1988). In addressing the state initiative process, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals clarified that
the initiative process was distinct from the petitioning procedures protected by the Petition Clause of
the First Amendment. See Biddulph v. Mortham, 89 F.3d 1491, 1497 (lth Cir. 1996) ("[ln the
initiative process people do not seek to make wishes known to government representatives but instead
to enact change by bypassing their representatives altogether."); Hoyle v. Priest, 59 F. Supp. 2d 827,
835 (W.D. Ark. 1999) ("As in Biddulph, plaintiffs' First Amendment claim is more appropriately
based upon the Free Speech Clause, and the court will construe it as such.") The Tenth Circuit, where
the Meyer case originated, has explained that "even though the initiative and referendum process is
not guaranteed by the United States Constitution, Colorado's choice to reserve it does not leave the
state free to condition its use by impermissible restraints on First Amendment activity." Am.
Constitutional Law Found. v. Meyer, 120 F.3d 1092, 1100 (10th Cir. 1997).
321. As one scholar has noted:
[Because] petitioning was at the core of the constitutional law and politics of the early
United States.... [Ilt was included in the First Amendment, not as an afterthought, but
rather as its capstone ....
For the colonists and citizens of the early republic, petitioning
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Consistent with the Petition Clause, a system that permitted citizens to
adopt advisory referendum "petitions" and submit them to Congress would pose
no threat to representative government. 322 A citizen referendum could serve to
meet this petition function as a separate opportunity for citizens to submit to
Congress a document with signatures requesting legislative action.3 23 Moreover,
this advisory right would provide citizens an opportunity to influence Congress
and to participate more directly in their democracy.
C.

An Advisory Referendum Processas an Agenda-Setting Tool

Implementation of an advisory national referendum process does not suffer
from the same constitutional impediments as a binding referendum. To the
extent such an approach merely commands Congress to consider proposed

embodied important norms of political participation in imperfectly representative political
institutions .... Petitioning was the most important form of political speech the colonists
had known, not just because of its expressive character, but also because of the ways in
which it structured politics and the processes of government, even as separation of powers
was becoming a reality. For individuals and groups, it was a mechanism for redress of wrongs
that transcended the stringencies of the courts and could force the government's attention on
the claims of the governed when no other mechanism could.
Mark, supra note 32, at 2157.
322. Citizens have employed the use of petitions with multiple signatures to demonstrate to their
representatives that a mass consensus existed on an issue. In 1799, a petition against the Alien and
Sedition Acts, which contained more than 6000 signatures, was submitted to Congress. Although the
committee to which the petition was referred reported unfavorably, representatives lengthened the
debate because the "subject... had been brought before the House by the people, and ought,
therefore, to receive a full discussion." 2 ABRIDGMENT OF THE DEBATES OF CONGRESS: 1789 TO 1856,
at 373, 384 (Thomas H. Benton ed., 1857); see also 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MISCELLANEOUS 181-

84 (1799) (recording committee report on "the memorials of sundry inhabitants"); 1 AMERICAN
STATE PAPERS: MISCELLANEOUS 215 (1800) (recounting petitioners contesting Senate contempt

resolution against Pennsylvania editor). Another example is a 1924 petition that bore thousands of
signatures and was rolled on a giant spool. 3 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS

1541 (Donald C. Bacon et al. eds., 1995).
323. Parties have argued that the initiative right is guaranteed by the Petition Clause:
According to Biddulph, Florida's initiative process impermissibly infringes his First
Amendment right "to petition the government for redress of grievances," applicable to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Biddulph cites only two right-to-petition cases in
his brief, Eastern R. R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (U.S.,
1961), and California Motor TransportCo. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
Biddulph, 89 F.3d at 1496 (other citations omitted). Some courts seem to have accepted this argument.
In Delgado v. Smith, the court approved of a district court's statement that initiative "petitions
represent the exercise of individuals of their fundamental rights to express themselves freely and to
petition the government for redress of grievances, which are protected against governmental intrusion
by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution." 861 F.2d 1489, 1497-98 (11th Cir. 1988);
see also New Progressive Party v. Hernandez Colon, 779 F. Supp. 646, 658 (D.P.R. 1991) ("We start
with the proposition that the people of Puerto Rico have the right to pursue changes and modifications
and find solutions to political status in the exercise of their right to self determination; that the right of
petition, speech, press and assembly are fundamental and inseparable."); Diaz v. Bd. of County
Comm'rs of Dade County, 502 F. Supp. 190, 193 (S.D. Fla. 1980) ("Citizens have the unquestioned
righ~t to petition their governments for redress of what they believe are grievances.... One means of
preserving this right is through the procedures of initiative, referendum and recall.").
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legislation, it would not conflict with the system of government set out in the
Constitution. Congress would still retain the right to act or not act within its
traditional authority, and legislation adopted would still be subject to a
presidential veto. In fact, this process would fit squarely within the intended
purpose of the Petition Clause.
1.

Revising Congressional Rules

Efficiency provided the principal argument for relieving Congress from an
obligation to respond to petitions. 324 By the second half of the eighteenth
century, petition use doubled, and Congress spent a significant amount of its
time dealing with petition measures. 325 As sheaths of antislavery petitions
threatened to bring congressional proceedings to a standstill in 1836,326 John
Calhoun argued that Congress had the right to change its process for dealing
with petitions under Article I, section 5, because Congress was granted the
327
power to control its internal procedures.
Although the debate raged for more than eight years, resolution rested on
the power of Congress to create its own rules of proceeding. 328 Prior to 1836,
Congress received petitions by motion from one of its members, usually the
representative to whom the petition was addressed, or by the parliamentarian if

324. See Smith, supra note 29, at 1190. ("During the congressional controversy in the 1830's over
whether to act upon petitions seeking abolition of slavery, John Quincy Adams strongly opined that
the right of petition comprehended the right to have the petition duly considered. Such an extension of
the right of petition, however, could exceed the practical limitations of our system of government.").
325. PETITIONS, MEMORIALS, supra note 29, at 6; see also Frederick, supra note 31, at 122-24,

130, 132 (noting that twenty-fourth Congress spent so much time debating emancipation issues raised
in petitions that it could not carry on other business and that gag rule barring Congress from
considering antislavery petitions sparked onslaught of additional petitions).
326. See S. JOURNAL, 22d Cong., 1st Sess. 65, 183 (1832) (statement of Senator Dallas)
(presenting memorial of president, directors, and company of Bank of United States praying for
renewal of charter); BARNES, supra note 35, at 114 ("It was not the immediate flood, however, but the
prospective deluge of abolition petitions that the gag rules had in view."); Frederick, supra note 31, at
130 (stating that inundating Congress with citizen petitions to influence federal legislation was
"commonplace" in early America); Smith, supra note 29, at 1172 (noting "the number of petitions per
session more than doubled during the second half of the [eighteenth] century"). Not only did the
number of individual petitions increase, but the number of signatures on some of the petitions
increased as well. Ild. Although the British government at times had attempted to limit the number of
signatures on petitions, the only restriction placed by some of the colonies on the right to petition was
that petitions be "submitted in an orderly and respectful manner." Id. at 1181. Other efforts to place
any limitation on the right to petition were defeated, and some petitions sported a significant number
of signatures. For example, a petition calling for the "disestablishment of state religion" in Virginia
was accompanied by 125 pages of signatures. Id. at 1172.
327. Senator John C. Calhoun, Speech on the Abolition Petitions (Mar. 9, 1836), in 2 THE
WORKS OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 465, 467 (Richard K. Crall

ed., 1888) ("[A]n express provision of the

constitution ... vests each House with the authority of regulating its own proceedings.").
328. Id.; see also HINDS, supra note 43, § 3314 (reporting House speaker's assertion that
Constitution allows each house of Congress to determine rules for presenting petitions). Even John
Quincy Adams, who vigorously opposed the gag rule, believed there was no right to a response, only
that Congress's obligation was to receive the petitions and to assign them to committees. Id. § 3312.
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the petition was addressed to the legislative body as a whole. 329 After a
congressional member seconded the motion, the petitions were read and either
voted on immediately or referred to committee for a report. 330 Congress
occasionally set aside a petition without a report, but this happened very
rarely. 331 In general, Congress considered petitions fully, and, as a result, a large
percentage of legislative proposals arose from these citizen petitions. When the
process changed in 1836 and again in 1844, the representatives simply voted to
332
amend the internal House rules with respect to the treatment of petitions.
If efficiency justified modifying the House rules relating to petitions, the
same argument supports use of a referendum process to selectively report on
petitions. If the burden of careful consideration of petitions consumed the
majority of Congress's time in the early 1800s, then to return to such a system in
present day undoubtedly would cripple Congress, considering population
expansion and technological advancements that could contribute to a
proliferation of petition filings. Congress could not reasonably be expected to
keep up with a petition process that mandated individual responses to each.
A referendum process need not compromise efficiency concerns if Congress
established threshold requirements and reserved the obligation of response only
to those referendums meeting these thresholds.333 Furthermore, a referendum
process offers two advantages over the current system that fails to adequately
address the right to petition. Citizens would no longer experience the frustration
of being completely ignored by their federal government, even when their
petitions contain significant numbers of signatures. 334 Furthermore, a vote by the
people would provide a more authoritative way for representatives to measure
the wishes of their constituents than they might get from opinion polls, which
may be both inaccurate and manipulated. 335 As Madison stated in the debates

329. THOMAS JEFFERSON, A MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE, XVIII § 388 (2005).
330. PETITIONS, MEMORIALS, supra note 29, at 7.

331. Id. at 11.
332. The gag rule passed in 1836 and was later rescinded. See supra notes 44-48 and
accompanying text for a history of the gag rule and its rescission.
333. Addressing specific recommendations for what these thresholds should be is beyond the
scope of this Article. The European Citizens' Initiative has a very low percentage of qualifying
signatures-only 0.20% of the EU population, or one million out of approximately 480 citizens.
Kaufmann & Schiller, supra note 162, at 9. Although Italy's referendum abrogativo only requires
0.08%, other European countries have qualifying percentages between 0.25% and 1.26%. Id. The
European Citizens' Initiative does not specify geographic distribution, but in the United States it
would be advisable to establish distribution requirements that prevented one segment of the country
from dictating the process, but instead ensuring nationwide support.
334. See, e.g., Press Release, Rep. Barbara Lee, Barbara Lee Submits Resolution of Inquiry on
Downing Street Memo (July 21, 2005), available at http://democracyrising.us/content/view/289/165
(regarding White House's complete disregard of 575,000-signature petition demanding explanation for
prewar documents that called into question President Bush's motives for going to war).
335. See, e.g., Jim Rutenberg, The 2004 Election: The Polling; Report Says Problems Led to
Skewed Surveying Data, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2004, at A23 (discussing errors in polling system used by
news reporting services).
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Clause is an avenue for the people to
over the First Amendment, the Petition
"communicate their will" to Congress. 336
The right of each House to legislate its internal rules is rooted in the United
States Constitution, which states explicitly, "Each House may determine the
Rules of its Proceedings." 337 Nothing in the Constitution dictates how Congress
must set its legislative agenda, 338 so the rules for processing legislation can easily
be changed in both the House and Senate. The simplest way to create this
referendum right would be an amendment of the House and Senate rules.
Amendment of these internal rules was how the current process was created.
Although Congress has not historically changed its rules very often, the process
is simple. Each house has typically created these rules "through unilateral
resolutions-that is, resolutions passed by one chamber without the involvement
of the other house or the president. ' 339 Usually, the Rules Committee for each
would make a report and a proposal, and then the motion would need to pass by
a majority of members of that House who were present for the vote,
The ease with which Congress can change its internal rules is both the
shortcoming of this solution. Because of the prohibition of
beauty and the 34°
"entrenchment,"
one Congress "may not by law interfere with the
constitutional right of a future House to make its own rules."'34t Consequently, a
single chamber of Congress could in the future eliminate its referendum process
as easily as one was created by motion and a majority vote in the respective

336. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 685-792 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834), reprinted in BILL OF RIGHrS
HISTORY, supranote 36, at 1096.

337. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
338. Lawson & Seidman, supra note 29, at 759-60. As Lawson and Seidman point out:
The Constitution carefully and precisely sets out the procedural obligations of Congress..
There is no provision, however, that requires Congress to take any kind of action
concerning citizen petitions. Indeed, the Constitution expressly provides that "[e]ach House
may determine the Rules of its Proceedings," which prima facie includes the power to
determine how and whether petitions will be handled.
The Constitution places very few limits on the agenda-setting activities of Congress....
The crowning blow, however, to the case for a congressional duty of consideration and
response is Article V. Article V is the one provision of the Constitution that contains an
express agenda-forcing clause. Whenever the legislatures of two-thirds of the states call for a
constitutional convention, Congress "shall call a Convention for proposing
Amendments...." The state legislatures thus have an express power to affect the
congressional agenda. If the original Constitution meant to give the same kind of power to
citizen petitions, or presidential treaties or appointments, it knew how to do so.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
339. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Using Statutes to Set Legislative Rules: Entrenchment, Separationof
Powers,and the Rules of Proceedings Clause, 19 J.L. & POL. 345, 346 (2003).
340. See Julian N. Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate: Entrenchment and
Retroactivity, 1987 AM. B. FOuND. RES. J. 379, 384-85 (1987) (listing a typology, including, "procedural
entrenchment" which "entails an attempt not to bind the future irrevocably, but to prescribe the
'manner and form' by which the promulgated directive can be changed" (quoting H. L. A. HART, THE
CONCEPT OF LAW 146-47 (1961)).
341. JEFFERSON, supra note 329, XVIII § 388.
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chambers of Congress. Although the filibuster rule shows us that there might be
"cultural and historical forces" that could dissuade members of Congress from
amending the rules to eliminate a referendum right, 342 there is otherwise no
assurance that such an amendment would guarantee a long-term right of citizens
to participate in the federal government through referendums.
2.

A Referendum Statute

A more lasting alternative might be for Congress to enact a citizen
referendum statute. This statute could provide citizens with a mechanism for
participating in legislative agenda setting at the federal level, comparable to the
right set forth in article 1-47(4) of the proposed EU Constitution. 343 Such a
statute could not, without violating the Constitution, give citizens the power to
bypass Congress and enact legislation as some binding initiative processes do at
the state level. Nonetheless, it could allow the people to participate more directly
and actively in the federal legislative process similar to the right to petition in
early America, and in a way that is consistent with the Constitution.
344
Although the Constitution allows each House to enact its own rules,
Congress has increasingly departed from this "usual scheme of legislative selfgovernance" by enacting "statutized rules," i.e., statutes that regulate internal
legislative rules. 345 The first statutized rule was enacted in 1789 and regulated the
order of business at the first Congresses. 346 Since that time, statutized rules have
addressed a number of topics including membership on congressional
committees, punishment for absent representatives, and the rules for debate of
347
some types of legislation.
If a referendum statute attempted to create legislation that directed
Congress's own rule-making authority and provided "it could not be repealed or

342. Often there are "cultural and historical forces" that might dissuade either House of
Congress from making changes to their rules. The example provided is the Senate's Cloture Rule
allowing unlimited debate through filibuster. Although more than a simple majority is required to end
a filibuster, if the Cloture Rule itself were put to a vote of the Senate, as it was at least once in the past,
only a simple majority of Senators would be needed to change the rule. See 121 CONG. REC. 5249
(1975) (reporting motion to cloture passed fifty-one to forty-seven); 2 ROBERT C. BYRD, THE SENATE
131-33 (1991) (noting Senate President's ruling that cloture had been invoked by majority vote was
appealed and reversed by Senate on roll-call vote of forty-five to fifty-three); CHARLES TIEFER,
CONGRESSIONAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 702-06 (1989) (noting barrier to rules change broken in

1976 only after twenty-six years of effort).
343. The statute could set forth the process in detail, including the required number of signatures,
or leave it vague as in the EU constitution. Detail about how a United States citizen referendum could
be implemented through the Petition Clause is beyond the scope of this Article. Issues of percentage
of votes, the distribution of votes, and method of voting (perhaps by Internet) can all be worked out
later.
344. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl.
2.

345. Bruhl, supra note 339, at 346. Bruhl coined the term "statutized rule" to refer to the
legislature's use of statutes to regulate proceedings. Id.
346. Act of June 1, 1789, ch.1, 1 Stat. 23 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 25 (2000)).
347. Bruhl, supra note 340, at 346.
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could be repealed only through some extraordinary procedure, '348 there could
be problems with entrenchment, the concept that forbids one legislature from
binding another in time or scope. 349 If the statute is directive rather than binding,
however, it satisfies the constitutional requirements.35 0 Furthermore, while each
House might still be free to change its own internal rules, such a statute would
exert political pressure not to eliminate the rule, and "legislative inertia" 351
might make it less likely Congress would change this statute than it might be to
change the internal rules of one of the chambers.
In conclusion, a referendum statute, if it does not purport on its face to
create an exception to normal legislative procedures, would not violate section 7
of Article I, which requires bicameral enactment of legislation and presentment
to the President. 352 Moreover, such a statutized rule could be a good way to
encourage Congress to create and retain a referendum process that allows
citizens to submit proposed legislation and be guaranteed careful consideration
of any such proposal.

348. Paul W. Kahn, Gramm-Rudman and the Capacity of Congress to Control the Future, 13
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 185, 193 (1985-1986) (defining such statutes as "second-order rules").
349. See, e.g., Newton v. Commissioners, 100 U.S. 548, 559 (1879) (reasoning that new legislature
possesses same jurisdiction and power with respect to legislative acts as its predecessors); see also Eric
A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal,111 YALE L.J. 1665, 1665-66
(2002) (arguing "constitutional axiom" barring legislative entrenchment should be discarded); John C.
Roberts & Erwin Chemerinsky, Entrenchment of Ordinary Legislation: A Reply to Professors Posner

and Vermeule, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1773, 1780-81 (2003) (endorsing position that Rulemaking Clause of
Constitution ensures right of each new Senate to adopt its rules by simple majority).
350. Kahn, supra note 348, at 191-94 (indicating that "second-order rules," those that address
other rules that restrict Congress's "future rule-making authority," raise constitutional issues, distinct
from "first-order rules," which do not bind a future legislature, but instead are directive).
351. Id. at 195 (citing J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS
12-29 (1980)).
352. The current Petition Clause process seems to represent a divide-and-conquer approach.
Because petitions are given little, if any, attention, citizens submit them randomly to Congress.
Furthermore, the process of referring them to committees without requiring a report or further action
marginalizes them and precludes serious attention. An advisory referendum would allow citizens to
exert political pressure on representatives to respond to the wishes of their constituencies, even if the
Constitution does not permit citizens to create binding law.

